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ABSTRACT
THE RIGA MISSION: THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST AMERICAN 
OUTPOST ON THE SOVIET BORDER, 1924-1933
Jeffrey Acosta 
Old Dominion University, 1992 
Director: Dr. Lorraine Lees
From 1917 to 1933, the United States did not recognize 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In 1920 the United 
States established conditions for recognition. First, the 
Soviet Union had to pay all debts owed to the United States 
government and its citizens by previous Russian and Soviet 
governments. In addition, all propaganda and subversive 
activities sponsored by the Soviet Union in the United States 
had to cease. During this period, the Division of Eastern 
European Affairs (DEEA) studied and collected data about the 
Soviet Union from its main "outpost" at the United States 
Mission in Riga, Latvia. The Russian specialists of the DEEA 
in Riga and Washington used the data collected to write 
scholarly reports about the Soviet Union and the Communist 
International. This thesis will analyze the reports written 
by the Russian specialists at the Riga mission and illustrate 
that the reports successfully defended the policy of 
nonrecognition by accurately demonstrating the Soviet Union's 
support of subversive propaganda activities in the United 
States.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 1918, President Woodrow Wilson approved a 
recommendation by Secretary of State Robert Lansing that the 
United States not grant the Bolshevik government of Russia "de 
facto” recognition. The United States was opposed to the 
communist ideology of the Bolshevik government led by Vladimir 
I. Lenin which advocated a violent proletarian world 
revolution. Within four years however, the Soviet Russian 
government had changed its foreign policy to one of peaceful 
coexistence with the capitalist nations until economic and 
political conditions were ripe for the inevitable socialist 
revolution. Until that time socialism would be built within 
the Soviet Russia. The United States government also 
gradually changed its position concerning Soviet Russia. In 
1920 Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby indicated that the 
United States would recognize the Soviet Union provided three 
conditions were met. First, the Soviet Union must pay all 
debts owed to the United States by previous Russian 
governments. Second, the Soviet Union must compensate 
American citizens for private property lost as a result of the 
Bolshevik revolution. Finally, the Soviet Union had to cease 
its support of all propaganda and subversive activities
1
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sponsored by the Communist International in the United States 
and its territories. As a result of the Soviet government's 
refusal to accept these conditions, a policy of nonrecognition 
existed between the United States and the Soviet Union until 
1933.
Throughout the period of nonrecognition, the United 
States government remained interested in the activities of the 
Soviet Union and its revolutionary agent, the Communist 
International (Comintern). The Division of Eastern European 
Affairs (DEEA) was established within the State Department to 
observe the Soviet Union and the Comintern and to defend the 
policy of nonrecognition until the Soviet government was 
prepared to meet United States conditions for recognition. 
An "outpost" or "window" was established by the State 
Department near the Soviet Union from which a specialist corps 
of foreign service officers (FSOs) could observe and study the 
Soviet Union. The "outpost" was located in Riga, Latvia close 
to the Soviet Union border. The Russian experts at the Riga 
mission studied in a scholarly manner all aspects of the 
Soviet Union. The subject of their reports included, but was 
not limited to, politics, economics, religion, industry, 
agriculture, the Soviet armed forces, foreign policy, and 
foreign trade, as well as the Soviet Union's control of the 
Comintern.
In response to a variety of domestic and international 
political pressures, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933, and called on the Riga 
experts for advice during the recognition negotiations. After 
normal diplomatic relations were established, the Riga 
specialists continued to serve in the government throughout 
the 1930's, the Second World War and the Cold War.
According to the Cold War specialist Daniel Yergin, there 
are two axioms which could be used to describe the historical 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
The first he called the Yalta axiom in which the United States 
"downplayed the role of ideology and the foreign policy 
consequences of authoritarian domestic practices, and instead 
saw the Soviet Union behaving like a traditional Great Power 
within the international system."1 The second axiom he dubbed 
the Riga axiom in which the United States treated the Soviet 
Union "as a world revolutionary state, denying the 
possibilities of coexistence, committed to unrelenting 
ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world 
mastery."2 The Yalta axiom, which Yergin believed guided the 
policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt, led to Soviet-American 
cooperation, while the Riga axiom, followed by Harry S. Truman 
and his successors, both caused and prolonged the Cold War.
Yergin and many other scholars agree that after 1945 the
1 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace; The Origins of the Cold 
War. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, Co. 1977; Penguin Books,
1990), 11.
2 Ibid.
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Riga specialists, particularly George F. Kennan, Charles F. 
Bohlen, Loy Henderson and Robert F. Kelley, were influential 
in the development of the policies implemented by the United 
States to contain the Soviet Union and its communist allies.3 
Yergin claimed however, that the above named specialists based 
their recommendations on the anti-Bolshevik attitudes they had 
adopted as a result of their service at Riga; an experience 
which had simply "confirmed predispositions and reinvigorated 
what had been the dominant American diplomatic response to the 
Bolshevik revolution."4
It can be demonstrated that as a result of their studies 
between 1919 and 1933, the Riga specialists were hostile to 
the political ideology of the Soviet Union. They believed 
that the Soviet government's support of the Comintern and its 
subsidiary organization, the Communist Party of the United 
States, constituted illegal interference in the internal 
affairs of the United States. In order to be treated as a 
legitimate government, the Soviet Union had to acknowledge its 
international responsibilities. However, as an examination
3 Bernard A. Weisberger, Cold War Cold Peace; The United 
States and Russia Since 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1984), 64-75; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wisemen: 
Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986), 347-85; David Mayers, George Kennan and the 
Dilemmas of Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 27; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security 
Policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25-53.
4 Yergin, 35.
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of the Riga reports will demonstrate, the purpose of their 
studies between 1922 and 1933 was not to develop a policy to 
contain the Soviet Union and world communism, but to insure 
that the Soviet government met the three conditions 
established by Colby for recognition. In addition, they 
wanted to insure that when recognition occurred it would be 
on terms favorable to the United States. The DEEA and the 
Riga mission which served it was created to provide a 
scholarly view of the Soviet Union, in service of American 
policy, and it served that function well.
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Chapter 1 
THE ROAD TO NONRECOGNITION
Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Russia1 began in 180. In 1832 the two nations signed a 
commercial treaty. Relations between the United States and 
Russia were distant but correct; with each country knowing 
little of the other. The sale of Alaska in 1867 and the first 
wave of Russian immigrants to the United States resulting from 
the Tsarist pogroms2 increased American interest in Russia by 
the 1880's.3 In 1885, the renowned American explorer George 
F. Kennan,4 traveled across Russia. When Kennan returned to
1 For the purpose of this thesis "Russia" designates the 
country that existed until November 8, 1917. After that date 
Russia will be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
or the "Soviet Union."
2 The Russian government sanctioned attacks against the 
Jews in 1881, 1903 and 1906.
3 George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. 1917- 
1920, vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1956), 17; David MacKenzie and Michael W. 
Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union (Homewood: 
The Dorsey Press, 1977), 399-41; Barbara Jelavich, St.
Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy.
1814-1974 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) , 167- 
68.
4 In this thesis there are two George F. Kennans who were 
related. The elder George F. Kennan (1845-1923) had a younger 
cousin, Kossuth Kennan. On February 16, 1904 Kossuth's son
6
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the United States, he wrote a book about his journey to Russia 
which was very critical of the Russian government. The book 
was entitled Siberia and the Exile System. Kennan wrote 
numerous articles about Russia for the next three decades. 
By the end of the 19th century, he and Dr. Samuel Harper of 
the University of Chicago were recognized as the leading 
experts in the United States on Russia.5
The elder Kennan's writings about Russia under the rule 
of the tsars sparked interest in the United States about this 
distant country. Many prominent native-born American 
liberals, inspired by Kennan's work, formed an anti-tsarist 
group called "The Friends of Russian Freedom." This group 
included the elder Kennan and Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain).6 
The organization supported Russian political activists and 
minority groups in Russia. They also lobbied Congress not 
to support treaties which would open trade relations with 
Russia until democratic political reforms were enacted.
A second group of anti-Tsarist lobbyists was also formed
was born and was named after the elder George F. Kennan. The 
elder Kennan did not have a family and after a visit with his 
cousin Kossuth, developed a close relationship with his young 
namesake. Inspired by the elder George Kennan's stories of 
Russia, the younger George F. Kennan pursued a career as an 
American diplomat and leading scholar on the Soviet Union.
5 George F. Kennan, Memoirs; 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967), 8-9; Mayers, 19-20.
6 Other American liberals who were members of "The 
Friends of Russian Freedom" included: Samuel Gompers, Robert 
M. LaFollette, Lynn Abbott, Jane Addams and William Lloyd 
Garrison.
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during this period. This group consisted of Russian 
immigrants to the United States. Like the native-born group, 
they worked to block commercial treaties with the Russian 
government. However, there was a fundamental difference 
between these two groups concerning the type of political and 
social changes they wanted for Russia. "The Friends of 
Russian Freedom" hoped to see a political revolution in 
Russia. They envisioned a government assuming power which 
would convert Russia into a democratic republic similar to the 
United States. The immigrant lobby, by contrast, hoped to see 
a social revolution occur, during which the peasants, workers, 
and oppressed minorities would seize power from the ruling 
aristocratic and bourgeois classes of Russia.7
As result of this difference, the two groups supported 
two different revolutionary factions in Russia. The 
immigrants supported the Russian Social Democratic Labor 
Party. The Social Democrats were adherents of the economic 
and political philosophies of Karl Marx. Party members 
included Georgi V. Plekhanov and Vladimir I. Lenin. Between 
1885 and 1898, under the umbrella of the Social Democratic 
Party, Marxist groups organized and became active in Russia. 
These groups supported strikes in Russia's factories. The 
secret police quickly learned of the activities of the Marxist
7 Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment 
1917-1933. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 9- 
11; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 12-13.
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groups. In 1897, Lenin was arrested and sent into exile in 
Siberia for his political activity. When the Marxists 
convened a secret congress in Minsk in 1898, the secret police 
learned of the congress and arrested others in the Marxist 
leadership, rendering the Social Democrats inactive.
In 1903, a second Marxist congress convened in London out 
of the reach of Tsar Nicholas II's secret police. At the 
congress Lenin took control of the Social Democrats and sought 
to restrict the party's membership to a small group of well 
indoctrinated Marxists. This small group would guide and lead 
the revolution in Russia. The leadership of the Social 
Democrats was to be centrally controlled by this smaller elite 
of Marxist revolutionaries. The orders of the central 
authority would be obeyed without debate. Plekhanov supported 
Lenin's platform which was accepted by a small majority 
attending the congress.
The minority members who refused to accept Lenin's 
platform wanted the party membership to be more open and 
objected to Lenin's proposed centralized control of the party. 
By the end of the second congress, the Social Democrats had 
become irreconcilably split into two groups. Lenin's group 
was known as the Bolsheviks (larger or majority group) and the 
minority group was called the Mensheviks (smaller or minority 
group).8
8 John Paxton, Companion to Russian History (New York: 
Facts on File Publications, 1983), 235-36, 317, 370;
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The second revolutionary group to emerge in Russia was 
the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs) founded in 1902. The 
political philosophies of the SRs combined the ideals of the 
Russian populist movement9 with those of Karl Marx. This 
party advocated the socialist style redistribution of the 
land, a federal state government, self-determination for non- 
Russian minorities, freedom of political expression, and the 
use of terrorist tactics to achieve its objectives. Between 
1902 and 1905, the SRs carried out several political 
assassinations and were considered by the secret police to be 
more dangerous than the Social Democrats. The SRs received 
support in the United States from liberal groups such as "The 
Friends of Russian Freedom."10
At the same time, official relations between the United 
States and Russia remained correct. The only controversy 
arose in 1911 when the Russian government decided to deny 
visas to Russian-American Jews who wanted to visit family in 
Russia. The two anti-Tsarist groups lobbied the Congress to 
abrogate the Commercial Treaty of 1832 in retaliation for the 
Russian government's action. The resolution to abrogate the
MacKenzie, 389-91.
9 John Paxton wrote that Russian Populists "sought to 
transform society by basing it on traditional peasant mir 
(community). Inspired by Michael Bukharin in 1873-74, the 
nadrodnik (populists) adopted the tactic of going to the 
people (khozhdeniye v narod) with the aim of educating the 
masses with revolutionary ideas." Paxton, 322, 371.
10 Paxton, 371, 322; MacKenzie, 388-90.
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treaty passed in the House of Representatives but not in the 
Senate where the issue died.11
On the eve of the Great War, the American people and
government as a whole knew very little about Russia and were
apathetic towards the political repression of Tsar Nicholas
II's autocratic government. George F. Kennan (the younger)
summarized American understanding of Russia and its people
during this period when he wrote:
There was nothing in the traditional American political 
philosophy to make Americans aware of such virtues as the 
Tsarist system may have had or to cause them to doubt that 
the removal of the system would be followed by rapid 
progress in the direction of parliamentary democracy. It 
had never occurred to most Americans that the political 
principles by which they lived might have been 
historically conditioned and might not enjoy universal 
validity.12
Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States 
in November 1912. Prior to entering politics, Wilson was a 
professor of history and political science, a writer and 
president of Princeton University. He was not well-traveled 
and had written very little about diplomacy, which he 
considered a minor aspect of government.13 Wilson was an 
intellectual and a moralist who expected the leaders of 
foreign governments to act morally, adhere to international 
law and meet international obligations. He was also a
11 Filene, 11-14; Paxton, 322, 371; MacKenzie, 388-90.
12 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 12.
13 Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United 
States and World War I. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 16.
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nationalist who believed that world peace could be achieved 
if the nations of the world accepted democracy. Consequently, 
Wilson viewed the autocracies of the world, including Imperial 
Russia, as abhorrent.
Wilson did not trust the diplomats and other bureaucrats 
of the State Department to negotiate and implement his foreign 
policy objectives. He considered himself the best secretary 
of state. Wilson also kept the State Department and its 
ambassadors uninformed about his foreign policy objectives. 
During his presidency, Wilson often used special envoys 
instead of State Department personnel to negotiate and head 
diplomatic missions. These special envoys, more often than 
not, had no previous diplomatic experience, and did not speak 
the language and had never studied the history, culture and 
politics of the country to which they were dispatched. As a 
result, they often gave the president a false assessment of 
the situation in the country to which they were sent.14
However, an argument can be made that Wilson's special 
envoys were no worse than the men who made up the consular and 
diplomatic corps of the State Department. Salaries did not 
cover all of the expenses which diplomats and counselors 
incurred. As a result only men from upper middle class and
14 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919- 
1939 (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1939; New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1964), 13-14 (page
references are to reprint edition); Kennan, Russia Leaves the 
War. 28-29; Smith, 24.
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wealthy families could afford to serve in the State 
Department. Many department personnel were alumni of private 
and Ivy League schools. Senior members of the department were 
often retired financiers, industrialists, or politicians. 
Most diplomats and counselors received their positions through 
political patronage. As a result the United States embassies 
and consulates were staffed by amateurs who learned the art 
of diplomacy on the job.15
In addition, the United States missions in Europe were 
unprepared to help the thousands of American citizens trying 
to leave Europe when the Great War began. These problems were 
compounded because the embassies and consulates were 
understaffed and had no provisions to hire more personnel. 
American diplomats, as neutrals, were requested to represent 
the interests of the belligerent nations and to insure that 
prisoners-of-war received adequate care. In 1914 the Wilson 
administration also instructed department personnel to send 
reports on the military, political and economic conditions of 
the countries in which they were stationed. The diplomats and 
counselors were not trained for this task and the reports 
received in Washington were inaccurate and often delayed. 
Most of these problems were not rectified until the passage
15 William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign 
Service of the United States: Origins. Development, and
Functions (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1961), 191- 
94.
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of the Foreign Service Act of 1924.16
All of this greatly concerned Robert Lansing, who became 
Secretary of State in July 1915. Lansing was born into a 
distinguished New York family and served for twenty-two years 
as an international lawyer. He entered public service in 1914 
as the Counselor for the State Department. Lansing has been 
described by historians George F. Kennan and Daniel M. Smith 
as a man of keen insight, who was very meticulous and had a 
precise legal mind. He respected and understood international 
law and had a great respect for the diplomatic process. Like 
Wilson he believed that nations should be governed by moral 
laws; idealism had its place provided it was adapted to common 
sense. Lansing believed that the purpose of diplomacy was to 
preserve the interests of the United States, and that it 
should be conducted carefully and coordinated only through the 
State Department. Wilson's practice of using special envoys 
through the State Department would lead to conflicts between 
the president and Lansing.17
The United States Ambassador in Russia during this period 
was David R. Francis, the former governor of Missouri, who 
received his assignment as a result of political patronage.
16 Isaacson, 141-42.; Mayers, 23-24; Frederick Lewis 
Propas, "The State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and 
Soviet-Americar. Relations, 1918-1938." (Ph. D. diss., 
University of California Los Angeles, 1982), 2; Barnes, 191- 
94.
17 * *Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 28-31, 150; Smith, 18.
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He was held in low esteem by the diplomatic corps in 
Petrograd.18 He knew little about Russia and did not speak 
the language. Like Wilson and Lansing, he had little respect 
for the Tsarist government. When the United States entered 
the Great War in 1917, Francis became much more active in his 
diplomatic duties. The ambassador was assisted by two men who 
had a great deal of experience in Russia, Maddin Summers,19
the American Consul General in Moscow, and Colonel William V.
20 21Judson, his military attache. Although they were not
trained as Russian specialists, they had a great deal of
service experience and were astute observers of Russia. When
18 Prior to 1914, Petrograd was known as St. Petersburg 
and was the capital of Russia. The Tsar's government changed 
the name of the city when Germany and Russia went to war. The 
Soviet government later changed the name of the city to 
Leningrad in honor of Lenin and moved the capital to Moscow.
19 Maddin Summers was the most experienced and respected 
American diplomat in Russia in 1917. He was a career diplomat 
who was married to a Russian National, Natalie Gorainoff 
Summers, a member of the Russian aristocracy. Like many of 
his peers he knew little about Russia when he arrived, but 
took advantage of his wife's linguistic capabilities and 
liberal social contacts to learn about the political situation 
in Russia.
20 • •Colonel William V. Judson was the military attache' to
Ambassador Francis. Like Summers, he was an experienced
Russian observer. In 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War, he
was a foreign observer attached to the Russian Army. He
returned to Russia in June 1917.
21 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 16-17, 35-40; Smith, 
137; Edward M. Bennett, Recognition of Russia: An American 
Foreign Policy Dilemma (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 15-17.
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one considers the poor training of most foreign service 
officers in 1917, Francis was fortunate to have them on his 
staff.
On 15 March 1917, Tsar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate 
due to a revolt of Russian workers and soldiers.22 A 
Provisional government took control of Russia. On 17 March, 
Francis recommended that the Provisional government, led by 
Prince Georgi Y. Lvov, be granted "de facto" recognition.23 
Lansing and Wilson approved Francis' recommendation. The 
United States was the first country to recognize the new 
Russian government.24
When a second revolution occurred on 7-8 November 1917,
22 The chief reasons for the March revolution were: 
hunger, the enormous casualties inflicted on the Russian army 
by the Germans and the inefficiency of the government rigidly 
controlled by Tsar Nicholas II and his wife, Alexandra. The 
Provisional government formed after the abdication consisted 
of the non-socialist parties which made up the Duma (Russian 
Parliament). The exception was Alexander Kerensky, a Social- 
Revolutionary and future leader of the Provisional government.
23 Traditionally the United States granted "de facto" 
recognition to a government which controlled the 
administrative machinery of state, ruled with the acquiescence 
of the people and had the ability and willingness to carry out 
and discharge international and conventional obligations of 
the state. A "de facto" government can rule with or without 
the popular support of the people. Regardless of its popular 
support, a "de facto government" is not automatically entitled 
to "de facto" recognition. The criteria for granting "de 
facto" recognition varied from country to country. Black's 
Law Dictionary. 5th ed., s.v. "De Facto Government" and 
"Government de facto"; Bennett, 12-13.
24 W. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the 
Russias (New York: The Dial Press, 1981), 713-26; Kennan, 
Russia Leaves the War. 13-19; Smith, 18-24; Paxton, 13, 280.
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the United States was both surprised and disapproving. Why
this occurred and the views which served as the basis for the
administration's reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution is the
subject of George F. Kennan's two volume history, Soviet-
American Relations. 1917-1920. Kennan observed that, in
general, between 1917 and 1920 Wilson's foreign policy
concerning Russia was confused and uncoordinated. The day
after the Bolsheviks seized power, Lenin announced his "Decree
of Peace." In his appeal, addressed to the workers and
soldiers of the belligerent powers, Lenin demanded the
immediate opening of peace negotiations and an end to the war
without annexations or indemnities. Since the appeal was made
directly to the people over the heads of their governments,
Wilson and Lansing believed it constituted direct interference
in the internal affairs of nations.25 Kennan wrote that the
Decree of Peace was:
the first example of demonstrative diplomacy, i.e. 
diplomacy designed not to promote freely accepted and 
mutually profitable agreements as between governments, 
but rather to embarrass other governments and stir up 
opposition among their own people.26
On 22 November Lenin took control of the Russian army and
initiated negotiations with Germany which would take Russia
out of the Great War. After difficult negotiations and a
25 A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, eds., Soviet 
Foreign Policy 1917-1945. vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1981), 30-32; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 74- 
77.
26 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 75-76.
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major military offensive by the German army, the Bolsheviks 
signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, and ended 
the war on the eastern front. Wilson and the Allied heads of 
state felt betrayed by the treaty, since thousands of German 
soldiers were transferred to the western front, prolonging the 
war and increasing casualties.27
In addition, Lansing believed that the Bolsheviks were 
a serious political threat. On 4 December 1917, Lansing, with 
the consent of the president, issued instructions to Francis 
that the United States would not grant "de facto" recognition 
to the Bolshevik government. United States representatives 
in Russia were to have no contact with the Bolsheviks. 
However, Francis was instructed to continue his diplomatic 
duties in Russia and hold the Bolsheviks responsible for the 
safety of the Americans in the country. Since the United 
States had not recognized the Bolshevik government, they were 
under no legal obligation to protect American interests in 
their country.28
In January 1918, Lenin abolished the Constituent 
Assembly. This assembly had been democratically elected just 
prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. Wilson and Lansing 
believed that the assembly would rule Russia effectively. 
Lenin's actions were used by the administration to justify its
27 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 85-98, 364-77; Smith, 
97; MacKenzie, 546-50.
28 •Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 80-84.
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position that the Bolsheviks did not rule Russia with the 
support of the Russian people and to buttress the policy of 
non-recognition, which would remain in effect until a 
democratic government took power. At the same time, both men 
retained the hope that by abolishing the assembly, Lenin had 
so angered the Russians that they would eventually rise up and 
overthrow the Bolsheviks in a counterrevolution.29
That same month, Consular Dewitt C. Poole carried out 
several missions which angered the Bolsheviks. Poole traveled 
into the Ukraine in an effort to make contact with 
counterrevolutionary forces and assess their ability to 
overthrow the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks knew of the mission 
and used Poole's actions to justify their case that the 
counterrevolutionary forces in Russia worked for the United 
States.30
While official representatives of the United States 
conducted various activities in Russia, Wilson also dispatched 
special envoys and missions to that country. These envoys and 
missions operated independently and did not report to either 
Lansing or Ambassador Francis. Wilson's special
representatives included the American Red Cross (ARC) and 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), both of which operated 
independently in Russia and were responsible for a great deal
29 Ibid., 343-63.
30 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 180-83; Gromyko, 75-
82.
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of the confusion concerning the administration's Russian 
policies. Consequently, the representatives in the two 
organizations were resented by the diplomats in Russia. The 
ARC was supposed to carry out humanitarian missions in Russia. 
However, between the fall of 1917 and the spring of 1918 two 
leaders of the ARC, William Boyce Thompson and Raymond Robins, 
were deeply involved in the political affairs of Russia and 
the foreign affairs of the United States. Both men wanted the 
Bolsheviks to be granted "de facto" recognition.
The CPI, headquartered in Washington under the direction 
of George Creel, was in Russia to carry out propaganda 
missions to raise the morale of the Russian army. The 
organization's two principal officers in Russia, journalists 
Arthur Bullard and Edgar Sisson, both became involved in 
intelligence operations. Bullard had first visited Russia 
during the failed 1905 revolution and was active in "The 
Friends of Russian Freedom" when he returned to the United 
States. In 1917 Bullard studied the Russian political 
situation and discreetly gave money to the SRs. Though he 
reported to Creel independently, he also tried to work with 
Francis. Sisson became involved in intelligence operations 
in order to prove Lenin was a German agent. He returned to 
the United States in 1918 with documents which supposedly 
proved this was true, although Kennan has written that 
Sisson's documents were not authentic. Creel and Sisson 
released the documents to the public in spite of Lansing's
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request that they be kept classified until all American 
diplomats had left Russia and the documents' authenticity 
could be verified. Creel and Sisson claimed that Wilson 
authorized their actions. The release of the Sisson documents 
provoked political opposition in the United States to 
diplomatic relations with the Bolsheviks.31 Wilson's third 
special envoy, whom he dispatched to Russia in January 1919, 
was William C. Bullitt, a member of the State Department. He 
had come to Wilson's attention a year earlier for his forceful 
arguments against an Allied military intervention into 
Russia.32 Bullitt went to France with Wilson as a member of 
the delegation at the Versailles peace conference. There 
Wilson ordered Lansing to instruct Bullitt to go on a fact 
finding mission to Soviet Russia. In addition, House 
instructed Bullitt to tell the Bolsheviks that if they agreed 
to an armistice on all fronts, the United States would insist 
that the Allies also accept an armistice. Finally, House
31 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 45-67.
32 In the spring of 1918, France, Great Britain, Japan 
and the United States sent troops into Russia. Wilson 
reluctantly ordered American troops into Russia for three 
reasons: 1. To prevent stockpiled war materials in Vladivostok 
from being captured by the Germans, or their "supposed" allies 
the Bolsheviks. 2. To prevent Japan from occupying Siberia 
alone, which Wilson and Lansing believed would only alienate 
the Russians further against the Allies and allow Japan to 
expand its power in Asia. 3. To allow American troops to aid 
the escape of a group of former Czechoslovakian prisoners- 
of-war known as the Czech Legion from Russia. The military 
adventure only lasted until 1920. However, the Soviet Union 
continually used the venture to illustrate that the United 
States could not be trusted. Smith, 137-152.
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further instructed Bullitt to tell the Bolsheviks that if they 
accepted the proposed armistice, the United States would 
resume economic relations with Soviet Russia.33
When Bullitt arrived in Soviet Russia he was met by 
Bolshevik diplomats Georgi Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov. They 
took Bullitt's mission seriously and arranged for him to meet 
Lenin. Bullitt and Lenin agreed that a peace conference 
between the Bolsheviks and all of the other "de facto" Russian 
factions fighting in the civil war would be convened. Bullitt 
returned to France on 25 March. However, he never met with 
Wilson to discuss the agreements he made with Lenin. Wilson 
decided before Bullitt's return that in order to maintain 
unity within the Alliance he would comply with the French and 
British governments' desire not to come to terms with the 
Bolsheviks. The next day Wilson became very ill and 
eventually collapsed on 4 April. During that period the 
president instructed House to confer with Bullitt. House 
informed Bullitt on 6 April, that in order to preserve what 
had been agreed to at Versailles the president had decided not 
to make peace with the Bolsheviks. Bullitt then left the 
government and became a sharp critic of Wilson, and a lobbyist 
for granting "de facto" recognition to Soviet Russia.34
33 John Silverlight, The Victor's Dilemma: The Allied 
Intervention in the Russian Civil War. New York: Weybright and 
Tally, 1970), 156-58.
34 Ibid., 158-69.
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The special missions and envoys confused the Russians as 
to who represented the United States in their country. The 
information collected by the ARC and CPI for example was 
passed directly to Wilson. However, the conclusions of the 
reports were often based on inaccurate information and only 
served to further exacerbate relations between the Bolshevik 
government and the United States. This angered Lansing 
because information concerning Russia released to the public 
more often than not resulted in misunderstandings concerning 
United States policy. Finally, no one knew who represented 
the president on foreign policy issues: the State Department 
or the special envoys.35
Between 4 December 1917 and 10 August 1920 the Wilson 
administration reacted to the situation in Russia in a variety 
of ways. Despite the policy of nonrecognition American 
diplomats remained in Russia until 20 September 1920, in the 
hope that the Bolsheviks would be overthrown or Lenin would 
abandon his communist revolution in Russia, neither of which 
occurred.36
Kennan emphasized throughout Soviet American Relations 
1917-1920 that misconceptions and ignorance concerning Russia
35 • • •George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. 1917-
1920. vol. 2, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1956), 208-33; Kennan, Russia Leaves the 
War. 45-67, 441-57; Gromyko, 79-80.
36 Kennan, The Decision to Intervene. 467; Smith, 94-
98.
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were "the roots not only of much of the ineffectiveness of 
American policy toward the Provisional government but also the 
difficulty experienced by many Americans at a later date 
adjusting to the realities of Soviet Power."37 He was critical 
of both Wilson and Lenin for being blinded by their respective 
ideologies which were based on misconceptions about their 
countries. If they had attempted to enter negotiations 
concerning their differences in 1917-1918, future Soviet- 
American relations may not have been so hostile.38
There were two additional reasons why Wilson and Lansing 
were unable to implement an effective policy in Russia during 
the Bolshevik Revolution. First, communication between Wilson 
and Lansing in Washington and Francis in Petrograd was poor. 
The communication equipment of the period was unreliable and 
insecure. Events occurred faster than Francis could report 
them and the Wilson administration could respond to them.39 
Second, not placing Francis in charge of all United States 
government activities in Russia led to a policy which was 
ineffective, indecisive and chaotic. The Provisional and 
Bolshevik governments were never sure who spoke for the United 
States or what type of relationship it desired.40
37 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 12.
38 .Kennan, The Decision to Intervene. 370-72.
39 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 77-84.
40 Ibid., 45-50, 52-70, 219-41.
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Lansing attempted to deal with these problems. He 
believed it was essential to understand the situation that 
existed in Russia, and its significance for the future. In 
1917, Lansing was one of the few members of the Wilson 
administration to consider the Bolsheviks a political 
organization to be taken seriously. In preparation for future 
communist revolutions he initiated reforms within the State 
Department which resulted in the creation of a special 
division to study Soviet Russia and the world communist 
movement. Lansing wanted the department to lead the 
diplomatic fight against communism in the government. In 
order to defend the policy of non-recognition, communism and 
the new Soviet Union had to be studied and understood.41
41 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 157; Propas, "The State 
Department," 18., Smith, 141.
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Chapter 2 
THE RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS
In the last decade of the 19th century the first serious 
attempts were made to professionalize the foreign service of 
the United States. At that time the foreign service was 
divided into two divisions, diplomatic and counselor. 
Counselors were responsible for understanding and reporting 
the economic conditions of the countries where they were 
stationed. The counselor division was not as prestigious as 
the diplomatic division and the low salaries of counselors 
reflected the disparity. In addition, counselors could not 
advance to the rank of ambassador or minister. Finally, most 
positions were filled via political patronage. Presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft tried without success 
to have positions filled in the foreign service by competitive 
examinations. Wilson and his first secretary of state, 
William J. Bryan, maintained and practiced the policy of 
appointment by patronage.1
Prior to 1924 there were no specialists in the State 
Department. Nor were there any programs within the foreign
1 Propas, "The State Department," 2, 130-32; Barnes, 191- 
95, 203-05.
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service where an aspiring diplomat or counselor could learn 
a foreign language or study the customs, history and foreign 
affairs of other nations. Between 1903 and 1913 the State 
Department attempted to train a corps of linguists but the 
experiment failed because the government would not appropriate 
funds that provided for formal courses in foreign languages. 
Like the counselors, the linguists received low pay and were 
not permitted to advance within the ranks of the department.2
After the Great War, Robert Lansing once again attempted 
to professionalize the foreign service. Lansing was not 
pleased with the performance of the service before, during and 
immediately after the Great War, particularly as it concerned 
Russia. Just after the United States entered the war, Lansing 
created within the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the 
State Department a special bureau that would focus on the 
affairs of Russia. This bureau was headed by Basil Miles, a 
diplomat with previous experience in Russia. After the war 
Lansing ordered all foreign service officers to begin 
gathering information on all political movements around the 
world. He did not want the government to be surprised by 
another Bolshevik style revolution.3
2 George W. Baer, ed., A Question of Trust. The Origins 
of U.S. - Soviet Diplomatic Relation: The Memoirs of Lov W. 
Henderson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 140- 
42, 166-67; Propas, "The State Department," 95-99.
3 "Division of Eastern European Affairs," The American 
Foreign Service Journal (February 1933): 54, report, Robert 
F. Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
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In August 1919, Lansing made the Russian bureau an 
independent political division within the State Department. 
In that same year the United States established the Riga 
mission. At first the mission was operated by Army 
intelligence officers. One of their missions was to serve as 
military liaison officers with the governments of the Baltic 
states which were fighting their independence from Russia. 
In addition, the Army officers gathered intelligence on the 
civil war in Russia, observing the activities of both the 
communist and counterrevolutionary forces. After the last 
American troops left Russia in 1920, the United States did not 
have an embassy and consulate in Soviet Russia from which 
events in Soviet Russia could be observed. In order to remedy 
this situation the State Department dispatched a commissioner 
to the Baltic States, Evan E. Young. When he arrived in Riga, 
Young assumed control of all operations at the Riga mission 
and the State Department had a "window" or "outpost" from 
which to observe Soviet Russia.4
The first generation of the State Department's Russian 
specialists were men who had experience with Imperial Russia. 
Most of them did not speak Russian and they did not understand 
Bolshevism. This first generation included Dewitt C. Poole,
(hereafter cited as Kelley Papers); Propas, "The State 
Department," 18-19.
4 Natalie Grant, "The Russian Section, A Window on the 
Soviet Union," The Journal of Diplomatic History 2 (Winter 
1978): 109; Baer, 81-84.
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Felix Cole, Arthur Bullard, Montgomery Scuyler and Evan E. 
Young. All of these men served at one time as the chief of 
the Russian division. The Russian division also had Professor 
Samuel Harper on its staff. Young recruited the second 
generation of Russian specialists while he was stationed in 
the Baltic provinces between 1918 and 1920. They included 
Robert F. Kelley, Earl Packer and Loy M. Henderson.5
In his final year as secretary of state, Lansing 
maintained that the best and quickest way to insure that the 
Bolsheviks would be forced from power in Russia was by 
continuing to deny them "de facto" recognition. At the same 
time Lansing and his successors maintained that the United 
States was opposed to any external intervention in the 
internal affairs of Russia.6
In 1920 Lansing's successor, Bainbridge Colby, defined 
the conditions for recognition. Colby made it clear that the 
Bolshevik government did not rule Russia with the popular 
support of the people. However, only the Russian people could 
remove the Bolsheviks from power. In order to be granted "de 
facto" recognition the Bolsheviks had to meet three 
conditions. First, they had to stop supporting the subversive 
and propaganda activities of the Third International in the
5 Grant, 108-109; Propas, "The State Department," 19- 
24; Baer, 83-84, 121-25.
6 "Policy of the United States Towards Russia," 12, in 
Kelley Papers.
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United States. Second, they would have to restore the private 
property of American citizens seized by the Bolsheviks. 
Finally, the Bolshevik government had to pay all debts owed 
to the United States by previous Russian governments. It was 
the mission of the Russian Division and the outpost at Riga 
to gather evidence in a scholarly manner to support the policy 
of non-recognition. In addition the Russian specialists were 
to warn the government when Soviet Russia was prepared to meet 
the conditions for recognition.7
A related issue, that of granting "de facto" recognition 
to the Baltic states, secured the Russian specialists' 
attention by 1922.8 Poole and the first generation specialists 
argued against recognizing the Baltic states because it would 
be a violation of the pledge made by Wilson in his "Fourteen 
Points" and at Versaille to respect and defend the integrity 
of pre-revolutionary Russia's borders. The first generation 
believed that Bolshevik control of the Russian government was 
a temporary phenomenon. If the United States granted the 
Baltic states recognition, the Russians would be less inclined
7 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1920. vol. 3 (Washington: GPO, 1936), 436-44, 
461-68; The American Foreign Service Journal. 54, in Kelley 
Papers; Baer, 140-46; Propas, "The State Department," 21-22.
8 In 1920, when Wilson's term as president expired, three 
of the first generation specialists, Harper, Bullard and Davis 
left the division.
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to overthrow the Bolshevik government.9
Young and the second generation disagreed with the first 
generation's analysis of the political situation in Russia. 
The second generation did not believe that the Bolshevik 
government's control of Russia was a temporary phenomenon. 
In addition Young, then the United States Commissioner to the 
Baltic States, argued that the nationalistic aspirations of 
the people of this region were legitimate and that the people 
of the Baltic states did not want to be a part of Russia or 
a republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
In 1919 and 1920 the Soviet government had recognized the 
independence of the Baltic states. The Baltics had been 
granted "de facto" recognition by most of the nations of 
Europe. The Coolidge administration agreed with Young and on 
28 July 1922 the Baltic States were granted "de facto" 
recognition. Granting recognition to the Baltic states in 
order to maintain the Riga mission was never used by Young in 
his arguments.10
After the Great War the United States tried to maintain 
an isolationist foreign policy. However, the United States 
was a great power, a position the government and people 
assumed with great reluctance. Many members of the government 
felt that the diplomatic and consular corps of the State
9 Baer, 149-56; Propas, "The State Department," 19; 
Smith, 137-52;
10 Baer, 149-56; Gromyko, 112-115.
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Department had to be professionalized in order to meet the new 
foreign policy challenges which would confront the United 
States. During his last two years in office Lansing had 
worked with Congressman John Jacob Rogers, ranking Republican 
on the House Foreign Relations Committee, to create the 
reforms which would professionalize the foreign service. 
After several attempts, the efforts of Lansing and Rogers were 
rewarded when the Foreign Service Act of 1924 (the Rogers Act) 
was passed into law. The law provided four basic reforms:
1. The adoption of a new and uniform salary scale with 
a modest increase in average rate compensation.
2. An amalgamation of the Diplomatic and Consular 
Services into one foreign service on an 
interchangeable basis.
3. Representation allowances for the purpose of 
eliminating or at least lessening, the demands on 
private means of ambassadors and ministers.
4. A retirement system based upon the principles of the 
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Act of May 22, 
1920, but administered entirely separately 
therefrom.
Following the passage of the Rogers Act, the counselors 
and diplomats became known as foreign service officers (FSOs). 
While these reforms were finalized, the department was also 
reorganized into six separate political divisions.12 One of
11 Baer, 133.
12 The other five political divisions were the Western 
European Division (WED); Division of Far Eastern Affairs 
(DFEA); Division of Latin American Affairs (DLAA); Division 
of Mexican Affairs (DMA); and Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
(DNEA).
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the six divisions was the Division of Eastern European Affairs
(DEEA) which had been created in 1922. The mission of the
DEEA was the following:
The Division of Eastern European Affairs will have general 
supervision, under the secretaries, of matters pertaining 
to Russia, (including Siberia), and of relations, 
diplomatic and consular, political and economic, with 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
For nine months Poole directed the DEEA. In early 1923 
Young was recalled to Washington to head the division. By 
1923 the four young men he had recruited, Kelley, Packer, 
Henderson and Lehrs had become members of the State 
Department. Once he assumed his post in Washington, Young 
transferred all three to the DEEA, to create a division 
staffed by men with a deeper knowledge of Bolshevism. 
However, the second generation of Russian specialists had the 
same mission as the first: to defend the policy of
nonrecognition.14
In 1924 the State Department was a small branch of the 
government, made up of 620 people of whom only 62 were FSOs. 
Under the new reorganization the FSOs would be administered 
by the Division of Foreign Service Administration (DFSA), 
which was controlled by Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur 
J. Carr. Carr supported the reforms of the Rogers Act. Prior
13 "Divisions of Eastern European Affairs," 57, in Kelley 
Papers.
14 Baer, 129-31, 156-57; Propas, "The State Department," 
19-20, 32-34; "Division of Eastern European Affairs," 54, in 
Kelley Papers.
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to the reforms he served as a civil service officer in charge
of the Consular Service. Carr as the head of the DFSA decided
where FSOs would be assigned. He had definite ideas about the
duties of an FSO, believing they were:
the faithful executors of policies made by elected 
officials. But fearing the effects of popular politics 
on the stability of international systems, diplomats 
viewed themselves as the international policy makers best 
able to accommodate the political needs of individual 
states to one another.15
Carr felt that specialist FSOs were a waste of the 
limited monetary and personnel resources which the Congress 
had allocated to the State Department. Scholarly reports 
required too much time to research and write, time which could 
be better used conducting other tasks required of the FSOs. 
Worst of all Carr feared the specialists would "politicize the 
foreign service through involvement with partisan foreign 
policy."16 The second generation Russian specialists and Young 
disagreed with Carr's assessment of their worth. In addition, 
the specialist had no control concerning the politicalization 
of the DEEA. Between 1924 and 1933 the Russian specialists 
were often instructed to appear before Congress to defend the 
policy of nonrecognition by the Secretary of State. In 
addition, their advice was often sought by members of Congress 
and the administration on issues concerning Soviet-American
15 Propas, "The State Department," 134.
16 Ibid., 135.
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relations.17
The four men who were the second generation Russian 
specialists came from different backgrounds. Earl L. Packer, 
from Utah, was stationed at the United States Embassy in 
Petrograd in February 1917 as a member of the Bureau of 
Insular Affairs in the War Department. Once war was declared, 
Packer was commissioned as a first lieutenant and made a 
military attache'. Throughout the remainder of 1917, he 
observed the political situation in Russia without any 
preconceptions based on the old tsarist governments.
After Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized power Packer began 
to study and gather intelligence on the Bolsheviks. 
Furthermore he learned to speak Russian. Eventually he was 
forced to move with other Americans to Archangel and in 1920 
he returned to the United States. He then left the Army and 
joined the State Department. Because of his background, he 
was assigned to the Russian Division. While stationed in 
Washington, he attended night school and received a bachelor's 
degree from George Washington University. In 1922, Packer was 
sent to Riga with Young.18
Loy M. Henderson was planning to be a lawyer when the 
United States entered the Great War. He graduated from 
Northwest University in 1915. Due to a childhood injury, he
17 Baer, 147-48; Propas, "The State Department," 62-65.
18 Propas, "The State Department," 20; Baer, 124.
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was rejected for service with the Army. However he joined the 
American Red Cross because he wanted to contribute to the war 
effort. Unfortunately he arrived in Europe after the war 
ended. Henderson was a man of deep convictions and believed 
in the mission of the Red Cross after the war. From December 
1919 until August 1921, he served in Germany and the Baltic 
provinces. There he worked to repatriate Russian and German 
prisoners of war and was involved in humanitarian relief 
missions during the Russian Civil War. During his work with 
anti-Bolshevik Russian soldiers who had returned to the Baltic 
provinces, Henderson contracted typhus and almost died. While 
in the Baltic provinces in 1920, Henderson met Robert F. 
Kelly.
In April 1920, Henderson was transferred to the ARC 
office in Berlin. There he met Young who was impressed with 
Henderson. Young convinced him to join the foreign service. 
Since the United States would become more involved in world 
affairs, Henderson took his exams for the service in 1921 and 
was accepted into the consular service. He was posted as a 
vice consul in Ireland from 1922 until 1924. When he returned 
to the United States, Henderson once again met Young who was 
at this time chief of the DEEA. Young recruited Henderson 
into the division. Although Henderson did not speak Russian, 
he was trained as a Russian specialist.19
19 Baer, 6-9, 61-118.
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Landreth M. Harrison was the third member of the second 
generation Russian specialist. Harrison joined the Foreign 
Service in 1927. Prior to becoming an FSO, he received a 
bachelor's and master's degree in political science from the 
University of Minnesota. Between 1923 and 1925 he studied 
European languages and international affairs in Paris. When 
Harrison joined the DEEA, he was permitted to study Soviet 
Russia independently at the Riga mission.20
The final member of this second generation was Robert F. 
Kelley whom historian Daniel Propas referred to as "the most 
promising and accomplished of these officers."21 In 1915 
Kelley graduated Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University with 
a bachelor's degree in European History. After graduation he 
wanted to research the history of the Crimean War. In 
addition to taking Russian classes at Harvard, he attended the 
Paris School of Eastern Languages22 (EIC) at the University 
of Paris to improve his Russian. Because of the war he was 
unable to go to Petrograd to continue his research so he 
returned to Harvard. He was working on his doctoral degree 
at Harvard when the United States entered the Great War.
Kelley joined the Army and received a regular commission. 
He served as an instructor at an officer candidate school with
20 Propas, "The State Department," 96-97.
21 Ibid., 33.
22 Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes.
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the 5th Infantry Regiment during the American occupation of 
the Rhineland in 1919. In 1920 Kelley was sent as a military 
observer to Riga, Latvia, where he gathered intelligence on 
the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War. It was during 
this period that Kelley met Henderson and Young.
Like Henderson, Kelley was recruited by Young to join the 
foreign service.23 He took the foreign service exam in 1922 
and was posted as a consul to India briefly in 1923. When 
Young became head of the DEEA, he requested that Kelley be 
transferred to the DEEA despite Carr's objection. Upon his 
arrival in Washington, Young made Kelley the assistant chief 
of the division and began to train him as his successor.24
When Young was appointed Minister to the Dominican
Republic in 1925, he chose Kelley as his replacement. Kelley
was chief of the DEEA and leading policy maker in Soviet-
American relations until 1933.25 In 1925 Kelley decided that
a corps of Soviet/Russian experts with post graduate training
in Russian language and history was needed, in the words of
DEEA historian Frederick Propas:
to promote the role of experts in the making of foreign 
policy; to defend nonrecognition; and to ensure that if
23 From the Commissioner of the United States Riga Evan
E. Young to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1922, no. 
2666, in Kelley Papers.
24 Propas, "The State Department," 33, 136-37; Baer, 122-
23.
25 Baer, 123; Propas "The State Department," 33-39; 
"Biographical Sketch of Robert F. Kelley," in Kelley Papers.
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recognition did come, the Soviets would not take unfair 
advantage of it.
Except for Kelley, the second generation Soviet experts, 
Henderson, Packer, and Harrison, did not receive formal 
training in their area of specialization. All three became 
experts through unstructured on-the-job training at the Riga 
mission and the DEEA office in Washington. To insure that 
future Soviet-American policy was conducted effectively Kelley 
decided that the third generation of Soviet experts would be 
formally trained linguists and Russian historians.27 Kelley 
worked with Allen Dulles, the chief of the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs, to develop programs to train a corps of 
career foreign service officers to become linguists and area 
experts in their respective divisions. Both men established 
guidelines to insure that FSOs selected for the programs were 
adequately paid. Moreover, they were to be considered for 
promotion on the same basis as their peers. The FSOs selected 
for the three year program had to serve an eighteen month 
probationary period of training at an embassy or mission in 
the country or region of their specialty. If at the end of 
the probationary period their superiors were satisfied with 
their work, they would be sent to school to begin formal
26 Frederick L. Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward 
Russia: The Training of the State Department Soviet Experts, 
1934-1939," The Journal of Diplomatic History 8 (Summer 1984): 
226.
27 Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward Russia," 213; 
Baer, 166-67.
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studies.28
On 4 June 1927, the program Kelley and Dulles recommended 
was approved by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg.29 
Because the Secretary of State authorized the program, Loy 
Henderson wrote that Carr "was sympathetic to the idea and 
agreed to take steps toward the training of a corps of East 
European specialists."30
Kelley immediately searched for a university in which the 
Soviet specialists could be trained. He rejected several 
universities located in the United States, England and 
Czechoslovakia because he feared that his young FSOs would be 
exposed to an academic community which was too sympathetic to 
the Soviet Union and therefore hostile to the policy of 
nonrecognition. Kelley finally decided on his Paris alma 
mater, the Paris School of Oriental Languages. The school's 
director was Professor Paul Boyer who had taught both Kelley 
and Harper prior to the First World War. Boyer believed that 
in order for a student to learn to speak Russian he must 
understand Russian history, culture and politics.31
O Q Propas, "The State Department," 102-106.
29 The policy was formally called "Regulations Governing 
the Selections, Training and Promotion of Foreign Service 
Officers for Language Assignments in the Near East, in Eastern 
Europe, and in North Africa." They were later embodied in 
Executive Order No. 4879 of 8 May 1928. "Division of Eastern 
European Affairs," 61, in Kelley Papers.
30 Baer, 167.
31 Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward Russia," 212-19.
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From 1927 until 1936 when the program was terminated, 
seven FSOs were trained in Kelley's program. They were George
F. Kennan (the younger), William M. Gwynn, Norris B. Chapman, 
Eric Kumiholm, Charles E. Bohlen, Edward Page, Jr., and 
Francis B. Stevens. All would be trained in Paris except 
Kennan. Pursuant to Kennan's request and because he could 
speak German, Kelley permitted him to receive his training in 
Berlin at the University of Berlin's Oriental Seminary.32 In 
addition to their studies, the student FSOs trained at Riga 
and other missions in Europe.33
Overall, the seven men who finished the special program 
appreciated it. The first year of the program was dedicated 
to learning the Russian language. The students averaged 
thirteen hours a week in the classroom and in some instances 
thirty hours outside the classroom learning Russian. Kelley 
discouraged the student FSOs from taking courses concerning 
the Soviet Union. However, reports from Riga were sent to the 
school in Paris and studied by the students. Kennan wrote 
that Kelley wanted him to "get the essentials of a good 
Russian cultural background; the rest will come later. It was 
a wise direction, for which I have always been grateful."34 
Kelley wanted the third generation to view the Soviet Union
32 The University of Berlin's Seminary for Orientalische 
Sprachen was founded by Bismarck to train German diplomats.
33 Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward Russia," 220-21.
34 Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1930. 33.
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with caution and skepticism based on research and evidence, 
not emotion. Finally, he firmly believed that the new Soviet 
specialists should speak Russian and study Russian history and 
literature in order to understand the Soviet Union.35
For many years, Kelley's policy was that no FSOs were to
visit the Soviet Union or have contact with Soviet officials.
However, after 1932 Kelley felt that there was a good
possibility that the United States' recognition of the Soviet
Union was close at hand. Kelley granted four of the students
in the program, Page, Bohlen, Chipman and Kuniholm permission
to visit the Soviet Union. The four could go:
under the patronage of the school and the Administration 
of the school would pay for their visas, etc. It was not 
contemplated that they should enter Russia for any purpose 
other than that of obtaining practice in the use of the 
Russian language or in any other capacity than that of 
student of Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales 
Vivantes.36
The students were to travel at their own expense and 
avoid publicity. Kennan was denied permission to go since he 
was no longer a student and representative of the government. 
Unfortunately the students never made the trip because it was 
too expensive. Nevertheless, within eighteen months the
35 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New 
York: W. W. Norton Co., 1973) 8-12, 39-40; Kennan, Memoirs
1925-1930. 31-34; Propas, "Creating a Hardline Towards the
Soviet Union," 216-23.
36 Earl L. Packer to Robert F. Skinner, 5 August 1932, 
Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the State Department 
in Latvia (Riga), Record Group 84, Russian Book 200, 080(R), 
National Archives, Washington D.C.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
policy of nonrecognition had been abandoned and Kennan, Bohlen 
and Kuniholm were working in the new American embassy in 
Moscow.37
Between 1919 and 1933, Lansing's goal of creating a corps 
of professional foreign service officers to defend the United 
States' policy with the Soviet Union was fulfilled. Each 
successive generation of Soviet/Russian specialists was more 
knowledgeable with respect to the language, history, culture 
and the activities of the Soviet government than their 
predecessor.
Robert F. Kelley was the driving force behind the desire 
to develop an understanding of the Soviet Union. Kennan wrote 
of Kelley:
He was a scholar by instinct and dedication. He had built 
his division up on scholarly principles to a point where 
I am sure there was no geographic division in the 
Department of State that had a better knowledge of the 
area which it dealt.38
By 1932 members of the third generation of Soviet 
specialists were serving at the Riga Mission. During this 
period the quality of the Riga reports improved. Although 
many disagreed with the policy of nonrecognition, the men of 
the DEEA were recognized as experts on the Soviet Union.
37 Robert F. Kelley to Edward Page, 3 March 1932, RG 84, 
Russian Book 200, 030R-800R; Propas, "The State Department," 
229-34; Bohlen, 16; Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 52-54.
38 Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 84.
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Chapter 3 
THE RIGA MISSION 1922-1928
By the time Young arrived in Riga in 1920, all United
States missions in Russia had been closed. Prior to 1922 the
embassies in Paris, Copenhagen, Constantinople and the Riga
mission observed Soviet Russia. In 1922 the task of studying
Soviet Russia and the international communist organizations
was given solely to the Riga mission. The other missions
around the world assisted the Riga mission in its efforts.1
Accordingly, the State Department expanded the staff of
Russian specialists at the mission. Young wrote that with the
additional staff members it was his intention:
to make the mission a sot of clearing house for the 
Department for all information on Russia emanating either 
within the so-called Baltic States or within Soviet 
Russia.
All aspects of the Soviet Union,3 Communist International 
(Comintern), and its subsidiary the Communist Party of the 
United States (CPUSA) were studied by the staff. The
1 Grant, 109.
2 Young to Charles H. Albrecht, Consul, Rival, 31 March 
1922, RG 84, Russian Book 18, 000-715.5(R).
3 On 30 December 1922 the RFSFR became the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union.
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through the Comintern. In return the CPUSA and other member 
organizations championed the cause of the Soviet Union and the 
world proletarian revolution in their native countries. The 
United States government and the Soviet specialists always 
considered the activities of the Comintern to be direct 
interference in the internal affairs of the United States.4 
A cessation of its activities was a necessary precondition 
for United States recognition of the Soviet regime.
The Riga mission was divided into two sections. One 
section handled the traditional roles of a United States 
mission. This included everything from the day-to-day 
diplomacy with the Baltic States governments to the issuing 
of passports. The second section, called the Russian section, 
observed the Soviet Union. The Russian section was unique in 
the annals of the State Department since its personnel studied 
a government which was not recognized by the United States. 
In 1923 Young returned to the DEEA in Washington. He was 
replaced by F. W. B. Coleman a political appointee. Coleman 
remained at the post of United States Minister to Latvia for 
nine years and remained supportive of the objectives of the
4 F. W. B. Coleman to Secretary of State, 14 January 
1926, Record Group 59, 861.00B/376/3522; "The American Foreign 
Service Journal," 59, in Kelley Papers; Baer, 161-63; John 
Lowenhardt, The Soviet Politburo, trans. Dymphna Clark (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1982), 24-25; Propas, "The 
State Department," 73.
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Riga mission.5
In addition to the Russian specialist FSOs, the Russian 
section of the mission employed foreigners as clerks, 
translators and intelligence agents. Most of these men and 
women were born in Russia or the Baltic States. Four of the 
people who served in these positions were M. C. Perts, Sergius 
Riis, Natalie Grant and David A. Lehrs. Perts and Riis were 
intelligence agents. The State Department provided funds to 
support their activities. Their intelligence sources included 
members of the Soviet government, Soviet citizens, visitors 
to the Soviet Union and intelligence agents from other 
European countries.6 However, information derived from these 
"human intelligence" sources were only a small part of the 
evidence gathered by the mission's officers. The vast 
majority of the material came from printed sources.7
David A. Lehrs and Natalie Grant served as clerks and 
translators at the mission. Lehrs was an American citizen 
born in Russia who could speak and write Russian and German 
fluently. He worked for the State Department in the fall of 
1919 as the translator for the first United States
5 Grant, 109-11; Propas, "The State Department," 73, 142.
6 In the Riga reports examined for this thesis, the names 
of Soviet officials and citizens providing information to the 
Riga mission were never revealed. The writer of the report 
usually identified them as IS/1, IS/2, IS/3 or IS/4. After 
1928, references to these individuals did not appear on any 
of the reports from Riga.
7 Baer, 162-63; Propas, "The State Department," 81.
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Commissioner to the Baltic States, John Gade. From 1921 
through 1923 Lehrs was a member of the American Relief 
Administration (ARA), a private organization which provided 
famine relief to Soviet Russia. The State Department 
attempted to use the ARA officers to gather information on the 
Soviet Union. Because most of them could not speak Russian, 
this attempt failed. Furthermore, Soviet officials limited 
their contact with the people and restricted their activities 
to famine relief in the countryside. However, Lehrs was able 
to send Young a large supply of Soviet publications which 
greatly enhanced the ability of the specialists to understand 
the Soviet Union. After he left the ARA, Lehrs joined the 
staff at Riga as a translator.8
Natalie Grant was born in 1901 in Estonia which was then 
a part of Imperial Russia. She studied at the University of 
Rostov and was employed by the United States as a translator 
for the ARA. After her service with the ARA, Grant was 
employed by the State Department. She worked for the 
department for thirty five years and eventually became a staff 
officer and American citizen. She worked at the Riga Mission 
from 1924 until 1939 as a bookkeeper and translator.9
As stated previously, the Russian specialists at Riga
8 John A. Lehrs to Young, 13 March 1922, RG 84, Book 18, 
000-715.5(R); Grant, 108-109; Baer, 63, 66, 172, 174, 184;
Propas, "The State Department," 80.
9 U.S. Department of State, The Biographic Register 1958 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1958), 264; Grant, 108-09.
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acquired the vast majority of the evidence used in their
reports from published sources. From the time it opened in
1919 until it closed in 1939, the Riga Mission tried to
purchase almost every publication produced by the Soviet
government and the Comintern. Armed with the publications
obtained by the Russian section in Riga, the DEEA studied the
Soviet Union in a scholarly manner and successfully defended
the policy of nonrecognition. Henderson wrote that:
The legation . . . had been successful in acquiring for 
its library and for that of the Eastern European Division 
a mass of Soviet books, pamphlets, newspapers, and other 
periodicals that was almost without parallel outside the 
Soviet Union. Both libraries, for instance, had complete 
sets of Soviet laws and decrees as well as numerous legal 
treaties, most issues of Izvestia and Pravda dating back 
to the early days of the Bolsheviks revolution, and files 
of other newspapers published in Moscow, Leningrad, and 
the capitals of many of the constituent republics of the 
Soviet Union.
The mission attempted to acquire books directly from the 
state controlled publisher Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga 
(International Book) and subscribed to fifty different Soviet 
newspapers and periodicals. These publications usually 
reached the mission within thirty-six hours of publication and 
were translated and analyzed by the staff and then compiled 
into a report. The subjects of the reports ranged from 
politics to culture. On occasion, a report was written in 
response to a specific inquiry from the State Department. The 
original report, the actual primary source material and
10 Baer, 162.
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translation of the material, was then transmitted to the DEEA 
in Washington. A copy of the report with enclosures was then 
"put into neat volumes by an expert Riga bookbinder - a member 
of a guild that went back to Hanseatic days."11 Each volume 
consisted of approximately 600 typewritten pages.12 A second 
copy of many of the reports was sent to the Ecole Nationale 
des Lanques Orientales Vivantes (EIC) in Paris to be used by 
the Russian scholars of that university. Beginning in 1928, 
the third generation Russian specialists studied the reports 
during their stay at the university. The originals received 
in Washington were read, analyzed and placed in the DEEA 
library.13 There the reports were used by the State 
Department to defend the policy of nonrecognition (1922- 
1933), or to prepare for diplomatic negotiations with the 
Soviet government (1933-1937).14
Most of the reports written between 1922 and 1928 were 
simple chronological accounts or monographs of the activities 
of the Soviet government, the Russian Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks and the Comintern. Natalie Grant wrote that this
11 Baer, 191.
12 These bound volumes are now located in Record Group 
84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department 
of State (Riga, Latvia) at the National Archives.
13 These reports are located in Record Group 59, General 
Records of the Department of State at the National Archives.
14 Baer, 160-65, 191; Grant, 109-112; Propas, "The State 
Department," 81-91.
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was an introductory period and "the views expressed by the 
personnel were not uniformly objective, and facts took 
precedent over analysis."15 Analysis was difficult because 
the Americans at Riga were studying the world's first 
communist state which did not act in a traditional manner. 
The early reports therefore tended to detail the operation and 
the structure of the Soviet government, Comintern and RCP(B).
When the civil war ended, the Bolsheviks had firm control 
of the urban areas of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR). However, only fifteen percent of Russia's 
population lived in the cities.16 The vast majority of 
Russians were peasants who lived in the country and resisted 
the efforts of the Soviet government to force them to live on 
collective farms or "kolkhoz."17 The collective farms were 
inefficiently managed by the RCP(B) and the peasants were 
forced to sell their produce at prices fixed by the
15 Grant, 111.
16 One Soviet source estimated 100 million Russians out 
of a total population of 130 million lived in the rural areas 
of the country. V. Lelchuk, Y. Polyckov, A. Protopopov, A 
Short History of Soviet Society, trans. Katharine Judelson and 
Anatoly Bratov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 101; "The
Organization of the So-Called Russian Soviet Government" by 
Captain Robert F. Kelley, USA, with a cover message, Evan E. 
Young to Secretary of State, 13 September 1922, 2666, in
Kelley Papers.
17 Soviet collective farms were called "kolkhoz" as a 
Russian abbreviation for "collective economy." In theory, a 
collective farm was a cooperative of a number of peasants who 
pool land and equipment and were paid according to the amount 
of work performed. The collective farms were managed by the 
RCP(B) members. Paxton, 211.
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government. In order to take control of their land the 
peasants revolted against the Soviet government. They hid or 
destroyed their crops, did not pay their taxes and 
successfully fought the Red Army sent to enforce Soviet 
authority. As a result of the peasant revolt the Soviet 
government could not feed the workers in the cities. The 
workers provided the political base which allowed the Soviet 
government to rule Russia. As the workers became hungry they 
also began to challenge the authority of the Soviet 
government. The most serious challenge to the Bolsheviks 
occurred on 7-18 March 1921 when the sailors at the Russian 
naval base at Kronstadt, near Petrograd, mutinied.18 Lenin and 
Trotsky used the Red Army to suppress the revolt. Lenin 
realized that if the RCP(B) was to maintain power in the 
Soviet Russia political reforms were needed. The new reforms 
were called the New Economic Policy (NEP).19
The specialists of the Riga mission studied the reforms 
instituted by the Soviet government under the NEP with 
interest. They informed Washington that the Soviets were in 
a state of transition: "From a state governed by the
revolutionary conscience of the proletariate, Soviet Russia
18 Soviet historians write that the Kronstadt sailors 
were led by "counter-revolutionaries and white guards." 
Western historians write that the sailors revolted because 
they wanted a more democratic socialist form of government and 
an end to the policy of war communism. Lelchuk, 99; 
Mackenzie, 477-78.
19 Lelchuk, 98-99; Mackenzie, 476-78.
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• , 20 is to be transformed into a state governed by law." The
specialists also noted the concessions made by Lenin under the
NEP to the workers and the peasants. Under the NEP, Lenin
gave greater economic latitude to the peasants and small urban
entrepreneurs while at the same time he insured that all
political power remained in the hands of the RCP(B). The
attempts to force the peasants to accept the kolkhoz were
abandoned. The right of private property was established and
Russian citizens were permitted:
to organize industrial and commercial establishments, and 
carry on trade occupations, provided they observe the rule 
of regulation and protection of labor in Soviet Russia.21
The people were no longer governed by the arbitrary laws of 
the local soviets. A national judicial authority was 
established.22
The political nature of the regime occupied the Riga 
specialists as well. On 10 July 1918 the 5th Congress of 
Soviets adopted the Soviet Constitution which provided that 
the supreme power of the RFSFR be held by the All-Congress of 
Soviets which met annually for five to seven days. However, 
the Riga specialists reported that the real power of the 
government lay within the All Russian Central Executive 
Committee (the Central Committee), the Organizational Bureau
20 Harold B. Quarton to Secretary of State, 31 July 1922, 
2395, in Kelley Papers.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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(Ogoburo) and the Political Bureau (Politburo). The Ogoburo 
and Politburo were collectively known as the Presidium. The 
All-Congress of Soviets elected the Executive Committee. In 
1921, it consisted of 386 full members and 125 candidates or 
alternate members. The Central Committee elected the members 
of the Presidium within its ranks. The Ogoburo was 
responsible for government party administration.23 The 
Politburo, headed by Lenin, was responsible for the day-to- 
day operations of the government and was the ultimate 
authority in the Soviet Union.24 While stationed at Riga, 
Kelley correctly observed that, "The political bureau may be 
regarded as the supreme directing force in the communist party 
and the Soviet Government." He also noted that the members 
of the Politburo held the leading positions in the Central 
Committee of the RCP(B). He further noted that the Soviet 
constitution was written to insure that the RCP(B) maintained 
political power in Russia.
The Riga reports indicated that while the RCP(B) had 
retreated from the policy of war communism they firmly
23 In 1921 the full or voting members of the Ogoburo 
consisted of Joseph V. Stalin, Aleksey I. Rykov, Michael P. 
Tomsky, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and Komarov. The candidate or 
advisory members were Michael I. Kalinin, Yemelyan M. 
Yaroslavsky, Ivan I. Dzerz insky and Y. E. Rudzutak. 
Lowenhardt, 18.
24 The full members of the Politburo in 1921 were Lenin, 
Lev Trotsky, Joseph V. Stalin, Lev B. Kamenev and Grigory Y. 
Zinoviev. Nicholas I. Bukharin, Michael I. Kalinin and 
Vyacheslav M. Molotov were alternate members. Lowenhardt, 18.
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believed that the NEP was a necessary but temporary retreat 
from the creation of a strict socialist nation. Kelley wrote 
from Riga that, "it has been under the Bolsheviks that the 
belief in the Soviet system has become sort of a new religion 
whose believers see in the Soviet Republic a new type of State 
which opens to the masses the possibility of taking an active 
part in the upbuilding of society."25
In 1921 and 1922 peasants who owned their farms still 
made up the bulk of the Soviet Union's population. They along 
with small businessmen were not considered workers. The 
RCP(B) believed that these Russians posed the greatest threat 
to their political authority. As a result the communists 
wrote the Soviet Union's constitution to insure that the 
successful peasant farmers called "Kulaks" and the small 
businessmen classified as members of the bourgeois could not 
obtain political power.
The Soviet constitution divided political boundaries by 
economic class, not geographic location. Under Article 23 of 
the constitution the Soviet government could deprive Russians 
not classified as workers of the right to participate in 
elections. The indirect methods of election used by the 
RCP(B) insured that political power remained in the cities 
where the communists enjoyed popular support. The RCP(B)
25 "The Organization of the So-Called Russian Soviet 
Government" by Captain Robert F. Kelley, USA, with a cover 
message, Evan E. Young to Secretary of State, 13 September 
1922, 2666, in Kelley Papers.
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approved all lists of acceptable candidates. The secret 
ballot was not used in elections and the communists 
intimidated voters to support the RCP(B) candidates. Members 
of the RCP(B) elected from the cities where the communists had 
political power were also allowed to hold positions in the 
rural districts where the city was located. Despite the 
efforts of the RCP(B) to keep non-communists out of the 
governments, the peasants of rural Russia elected 102 non­
communist members out of 1611 members to the All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets in 1921. Kelley concluded that the 
superior organizational skills, dedication and discipline of 
the communists would insure that the RCP(B) would maintain 
power in Russia for a long time.26
In May 1922 Lenin suffered the first of a series of 
strokes that would eventually kill him. During this period 
he became less active in the day-to-day operations of the 
Soviet government and the Soviet Union was ruled by a 
triumvirate or "troika" led by Joseph Stalin, Gregory Zinoviev 
and Lev B. Kamenev. Lenin died on 21 January 1924. In May, 
on the eve of the 13th Party Conference of the RCP(B), 
Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, presented the party with 
two letters he had written in December 1923 and early January 
1924. The letters known as "Lenin's Last Testament" were very 
critical of the Stalin-Kamenev-Zinoviev troika. The letters
26 Ibid.
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in which Lenin was most critical of Stalin were first read to 
the Central Committee, of which Krupskaya was a full member. 
In the letters, Lenin warned that Stalin had too much power 
in the RCP(B) ; he was a full member of the Politburo, Ogoburo, 
Central Committee and the Comintern. As the head of the 
Ogoburo, Stalin expanded the size of the local communist 
bureaucracies and the Central Committee. He filled these new 
positions with men who were personally loyal to him. Lenin, 
in his letters cautioned the party membership that in time 
Stalin could abuse his power. Stalin in his own defense 
claimed that he only wanted to revitalize the RCP(B) and to 
make the party more popular with the masses.27 After the 
letters were read, the Central Committee voted 30 to 10 to 
allow the three members of the Troika to maintain their 
positions. Furthermore they agreed not to read the letters 
before the party congress.28
This occurred because with Lenin's death, the Soviet 
government and RCP(B) were divided into four factions. The 
first was made up of Stalin's supporters. The second 
consisted of Bukharin's Right Opposition. The Right 
Opposition wanted to maintain the policies of the NEP and to 
build the Soviet Union through a policy of cooperation with 
noncommunist Russians and the capitalist nations. The third
27 Mackenzie, 480-84; Lowenhardt, 21-22.
28 Mackenzie, 482; Lowenhardt, 23-25; Paxton, 233, 341.
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faction was Trotsky's Left Opposition. The Left Opposition 
believed that the RCP(B) had an obligation to move the Soviet 
Union rapidly towards socialism and to actively support the 
proletarian world revolution. The last group was led by 
Zinoviev and Kamenev and their supporters in Petrograd.
Trotsky and Bukharin attempted to use Lenin's criticisms 
of Stalin to remove him from power. Stalin, with the aid of 
Zinoviev and Kamenev, was able to parry their challenge. 
Between 1924 and 1926 Stalin continued to consolidate his 
power by supporting the Right Opposition against the Left 
Opposition. At the same time, he continued to expand the size 
of the RCP(B) and the Central Committee,29 but did not alter 
the size of the Politburo. In 1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev began 
to withdraw support from Stalin. That same year, Stalin began 
to advocate a new policy where the first priority of the 
government and the RCP(B) was to build socialism in the Soviet 
Union. Since world proletarian revolution was not imminent, 
Stalin wanted to build the Soviet Union into a major socialist 
economic and military power. Once this was accomplished, the 
RCP(B) would be in a better position to support the world 
revolution when it occurred. Under this policy Stalin wanted 
members of the Comintern to abandon their quest for political 
power in their native lands in favor of building socialism in
29 In 1921 the Central Committee consisted of 57 full and 
candidate members. In 1924 the committees membership had been 
expanded to a total of 139 members. Lowenhardt, 25.
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the Soviet Union. To accomplish this, he demanded that the 
Comintern strictly follow the instructions of the RCP(B). 
Stalin claimed that his policies were in line with the 
political philosophies espoused by Lenin.
The Left Opposition opposed Stalin's plan as did Zinoviev 
and Kamenev. In 1926 with the aid of his communist loyalists 
and the Right Opposition, Stalin had Kamenev, Trotsky and 
Zinoviev expelled from the Politburo. They were replaced by 
loyal Stalinists, Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Michael I. 
Kalinin. In 1928 Stalin moved against the Right Opposition 
and had Trotsky expelled from the communist party. Through 
these actions, Stalin had built a government and a party which 
was personally loyal to him. Once this was accomplished, 
Stalin turned on the peasants and brutally forced them to 
accept the "kolkhoz." By 1929 Stalin was in firm control of 
the Soviet Union and its chief international organ, the 
Comintern.30
The Russian specialists accurately recorded Stalin's rise 
in the Soviet government. However, they did not analyze how 
he used the Ogoburo to build a base of political support but 
only noted that each year the government and the RCP(B) became 
more totalitarian.31 An accurate account of the leaders of the
30 MacKenzie, 484-90; Lowenhardt, 25-28.
31 F. W. B. Coleman to Secretary of State, 5 April 1924, 
RG 59, 861.00B/180/1874; Coleman to Secretary of State, 27 
August 1924, RG 59, 861.00B/229/152.
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Soviet Union was maintained and reported to the DEEA. 
Furthermore, it was noted that each year the RCP(B) attempted 
to increase its political support among the country's rural 
peasants. Beginning in 1926 the specialists recorded Stalin's 
move to assume full control of the Soviet government with the 
expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Politburo.32
As the programs, policies and standards of the DEEA 
improved, so did the quality of the Riga reports.33 In 1927 
Louis Sussdorff, Jr. became the charge d affairs of the Riga 
Mission. After he arrived the new policies and standards were 
implemented and the reports began to contain more analyses. 
A wide variety of subjects ranging from economics to politics; 
domestic and foreign policies; science and technology; and the 
armed forces were addressed in the reports. For example 
Stalin's implementation of forced collectivization was 
reported. The specialists reported that the Red Army was 
indoctrinated and used to enforce the policy. Finally, they 
noted that with the implementation of collectivization, and 
the expulsion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from positions 
of authority within the government, Stalin was moving the 
Soviet Union towards socialism. The specialists believed the
32 Coleman to Secretary of State, 6 July 1925, RG 59, 
861.00B/322/2998; Coleman to Secretary of State, 5 August 
1925, RG 59, 861.00B/336/3080; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
14 January 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/376/3522; Coleman to Secretary 
of State, 5 February 1926, RG 59, 861.00B/379/3566.
33 Propas, "The State Department," 83.
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dictatorship of the proletariate led by Stalin would remain
<% «in control of the Soviet Union for an indefinite period.
With these supports to sustain them, between 1922 and 
1928 the Russian/Soviet specialists at Riga and the DEEA in 
Washington successfully defended the policy of nonrecognition. 
The first challenge occurred in 1922 when Lenin sent George 
Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the meeting 
of the Supreme Allied Council in Cannes, France and the Genoa 
Conference. Lenin realized that the Soviet Union was 
devastated after seven years of war. Furthermore, both Europe 
and the United States had recovered economically from the 
Great War thus indefinitely postponing the inevitable world 
proletarian revolution. Lenin wanted diplomatic relations 
with the capitalist nations, especially Great Britain and the 
United States. What Lenin wanted most from the two nations 
were loans and technical assistance. These were necessary to 
convert the Soviet Union from an agricultural to an industrial 
nation. Until the proletarian revolution occurred Lenin 
stated that the Soviet Union would be guided by a policy of 
peaceful coexistence with the capitalist nations as
34 Coleman to Secretary of State, 14 April 1925, RG 59, 
861.00B/315; Louis Sussdorff, Jr. to Secretary of State, 5 
January 1928, RG 59, 861.00B/31/5807; Sussdorff to Secretary 
of State, 19 October 1928, RG 59, 861.00B/29/5626; Sussdorff 
to Secretary of State, 26 October 1928, RG 59, 861.00B/5652; 
Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 19 November 1928, RG 59, 
861.00B/5703; Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 22 November 
1928, RG 59, 861.00B/5722.
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Chicherin's international role indicated.35 The European 
governments endorsed the policy of peaceful coexistence. In 
1922 for example, the Treaty of Rapallo was signed between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. In the treaty Germany opened 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet government. These events 
marked the beginning of the end of the diplomatic isolation 
of the Soviet Union.36
The Riga specialists sent reports to the DEEA which 
outlined these goals of Soviet foreign policy. First, the 
specialists noted that the Soviets wanted to end their 
country's diplomatic isolation. Second, the Soviet Union 
would avoid a war with a capitalist nation (s) until their 
armed forces were strengthened. Finally, the Soviet diplomats 
would encourage international rivalries between the capitalist 
nations. These policies would allow the Soviet government to 
maintain its image as a peaceful nation and prevent the 
formation of an alliance between the capitalist nations 
against the Soviet Union.37
However, establishment of relations with the United 
States involved more steps. The Soviet government knew that
35 H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State, 30 August 
1924, RG 59, 861.00B/231/2434; MacKenzie, 550-51.
36 MacKenzie, 550.
37 Dodge to Secretary of State, 30 August 1924, RG 59, 
861.00B/231/2434.
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in order to be granted "de facto"38 recognition by the United 
States, pre-war debts had to be paid and subversive activities 
by the Comintern in the United States had to cease. The 
Soviet government challenged the issue of paying the debts of 
previous Russian governments by claiming that the United 
States must pay for property destroyed or damaged by the 
American troops during the 1918-1920 intervention. 
Coincidentally the damage estimates amounted to a little more 
than the debts claimed by the United States.39 Their approach 
concerning the Comintern was tangled. Due to the reports and 
evidence collected by the Riga mission, the Soviet officials 
were forced to lie about the Comintern's role as a subversive 
organ of their government. On 11 January 1924, Coleman 
reported that the Soviet government was aware of the Riga 
Mission and instructed its diplomats to tell the public that
38 The DEEA was concerned how the Congress and 
international community would interpret the presence of both 
American and Soviet diplomats at international conferences. 
The major question to be answered was: If the United States 
and the Soviet Union signed an international agreement 
jointly, did this constitute "de facto" recognition on the 
part of the United States? The diplomats at the DEEA said no. 
However, at all future conferences attended by the United 
States and the Soviet Union, American diplomats inserted a 
reservation clause in all documents jointly signed by the two 
nations. The reservation stipulated that acceptance of the 
agreement by both countries did constitute the granting of "de 
facto" recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States. 
Baer, 160-61; Propas, "The State Department," 44-51; 
MacKenzie, 550.
39 MacKenzie, 550.
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the documents collected by the mission were forgeries.40
However, the specialists at Riga were able to prove that 
the chief of the Comintern, Zinoviev, was also a member of the 
Politburo. Zinoviev was not the only member of the Soviet 
government who was both a member of the Politburo and the 
Comintern. Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev and Stalin were all 
members of the Comintern's leadership.41 The mission also 
collected documents which contained instructions and guidance 
from the RCP(B) and the Soviet Government to the Comintern. 
For example, communist parties that were part of the Comintern 
were instructed by the Soviet government not to alienate the 
workers in their country. Each communist party was to base 
its tactics on the unique political, economic and social 
condition of their country. The ultimate objective of every 
member party of the Comintern was to be prepared to seize 
power under the direct orders of the RCP(B) when conditions 
were correct for the world proletarian revolution. Orders 
from Moscow were to be obeyed with "unquestioning 
obedience.1,42
40 Coleman to Secretary of State, 11 January 1924, RG 59, 
861.00B/1746; Gromyko, 216.
41 Coleman to Secretary of State, 6 July 1925, RG 59, 
861.00B/322/2998; Coleman to Secretary of State, 16 July 1924, 
RG 59, 861.00B/213.
42 Robert W. Bliss to Secretary of State, 3 March 1924, 
RG 59, 861.00B/173/144; Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 March 
1924, RG 59, 861.00B/186/1871; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
20 January 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/289/2642; Coleman to Secretary 
of State, 24 January 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/292/2650; Coleman
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In addition, the United States learned from the Russian 
specialists and the DEEA how the Soviet government financed 
and controlled the Comintern and how the RCP(B) moved 
propaganda materials overseas. The Soviet trade delegations 
in the United States, were instructed to maintain contact with 
the CPUSA and its subsidiary organizations.43 The specialists 
at Riga obtained from Soviet newspaper articles the names of 
Americans who were active in the Comintern and reported that 
the Soviet government followed the activities of the CPUSA 
with interest.44 During the 1920's it was noted by the Soviet 
government that the CPUSA had very little support from the 
workers of the United States. The RCP(B) and the Comintern 
recommended that the CPUSA increase party membership by 
providing financial assistance to unemployed workers, poor 
farmers and African-Americans who were victims of 
institutional racial segregation in many parts of the United 
States.45
to Secretary of State, 18 March 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/299/1018.
43 Coleman to Secretary of State, 17 January 1924, RG 59, 
861.00B/160; Charles L. Kasey to Secretary of State, 9 
February 1924, RG 59, 861.00B; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
8 March 1924, RG 59; 861.00B/170F; Coleman to Secretary of 
State, 8 October 1924, RG 59, 861.00B/324/2831; Coleman to 
Secretary of State, 23 November 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/365/3386.
44 Dodge to Secretary of State, 14 March 1924, RG 59, 
861.00B/174/2232; Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 May 1925, 
RG 59, 861.00B/324/2831.
45 Coleman to Secretary of State, 12 October 1924, RG 59, 
861.00B/358/3267, J.C. White to Secretary of State, 20 August 
1925, RG 59, 861.00B/342/3129; White to Secretary of State, 
3 September 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/349/3174.
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The Soviet specialists did not agree on how Stalin's rise
to power would affect the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the Comintern. Russian specialists David MacGowan
and Lehrs believed that the expulsion of Trotsky and Kamenev
from the Politburo indicated “a mortal blow" to the Comintern.
Coleman believed the opposite was true based on information
provided by American intelligence sources and Latvian
intelligence officers. Soviet periodicals stated that in 1926
the Soviet government had committed financial resources to the
Comintern. As a result, Coleman concluded that the Comintern
was subservient to the Soviet government and was still under
Stalin's strict control. He wrote:
When proof was available that the Soviet Government has 
ceased to allot funds for this purpose, then, and only 
then, will one be justified in believing that Russia has 
turned the corner in her international relations.
As this chapter has shown, the Riga reports written 
between 1922 and 1928 were in large part factual accounts of 
the activities of the Soviet government, RCP(B) and the 
Comintern. However, Natalie Grant's contention that the 
reports written during this period contained little analysis 
was accurate.47 Yet the reports served their purpose. In 
1923, Hughes argued against granting the Soviet Union "de 
facto" recognition for economic reasons. Hughes admitted that
46 Coleman to Secretary of State, 28 January 1926, RG 59, 
861.00B/378/3545.
47 Grant, 111.
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trade with the Soviet Union would benefit the United States 
but noted that the countries's principles were not for sale. 
However, American citizens were free to conduct business in 
the Soviet Union at their own risk.48
In that same year Senator William E. Borah, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held hearings in 
attempt to have legislation passed which granted the Soviet 
Union "de facto" recognition. Hughes sent Young and Kelley 
before Borah's committee to defend the policy of 
nonrecognition. Young in turn left it to Kelley to speak for 
the administration. Armed with evidence collected by the Riga 
Mission and his own experiences, Kelley clearly demonstrated 
that the Soviet Union had not met the conditions established 
by the United States for recognition. Borah then asked Kelley 
specifically why the United States should not grant the Soviet 
Union "de facto" recognition. If they violated the agreement, 
the United States could withdraw recognition or sever 
diplomatic relations. Kelley told the senator that according 
to international law and domestic courts once "de facto" 
recognition was granted, it could not be taken away, even if 
there was a legitimate grievance between the two nations. Due 
in large part to Kelley's testimony, the committee voted to 
continue the policy of nonrecognition. The testimony 
established Kelley's reputation as the department's foremost
48 Baer, 147-48; "Policy of the United States Towards 
Soviet Russia," in Kelley Papers.
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expert on Soviet Russia. Kelley was the government's guide 
concerning Soviet-American relations and the policy of 
nonrecognition until 1933.49
The reports from this period, therefore provided partial 
evidence to defend the policy of nonrecognition by 
demonstrating the Soviet's noncompliance with conditions for 
recognition. In addition, the Riga FSO's proved that the 
Comintern was a subversive organ of the RCP(B) and the Soviet 
Union. They strengthened the belief that the Soviet 
government's support of the Comintern and its subsidiary, the 
CPUSA, was interference in the internal affairs of the United 
States. By contrast the reports provided little information 
regarding the Soviet Union's ability to pay the pre-war debts 
of previous Russian governments.
49 Baer, 123, 145-49; Propas, "The State Department," 33-
39.
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Chapter 4 
THE RIGA MISSION REPORTS 1929-1933
Beginning in 1929, the reports written by the specialists 
at Riga evolved from simple chronologies to more scholarly 
analyses of the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The reason 
for the improved quality of the reports was due partially to 
the large library collected on the Soviet Union. In addition, 
the staff now had an excellent corps of FSOs, many of whom had 
studied the Soviet Union for seven years.1 In that same year, 
as Loy M. Henderson wrote, two significant events occurred in 
the United States and the Soviet Union. In October, the Great 
Depression began in the United States. One month later in the 
Soviet Union, Stalin became the supreme ruler.2
The Soviet specialists watched with great interest as 
Stalin consolidated his power. By 1929 they determined that 
the Comintern and its major subsidiary organizations such as 
the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern)3 were
1 Grant, 112-114; Baer, 179-81; Propas, "The State 
Department," 74-75.
2 Baer, 186-87.
3 The Profintern, subordinate to the Comintern, was 
created in 1919 at the same time that the Comintern was 
created.
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under the direction of the Soviet government and the All- 
Union Communist Parties of Bolsheviks or AUCP(B) .4 By the end 
of 1929, all four organizations were controlled by Joseph V. 
Stalin.5
As the Riga mission noted Stalin's rise to power during 
the first ten months of 1929 was not easy. First he had to 
"purge" from the AUCP(B) the members of the Right Opposition 
led by Nicholas I. Bukharin, who opposed Stalin's five-year 
plan to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union6 and were also 
against the policy of collectivization.7 However, Bukharin's 
power in the party was so strong that in May 1929 Coleman 
reported that the Soviet Union's secret police, the GPU,8 
refused to arrest Bukharin.9 Yet by August, Stalin had purged
4 In 1927 at the 15th Congress of the Russian Communist 
Party the name of the party was changed to the All Union 
Communist Party of Bolsheviks which reflected the 
incorporation of all of the republic's communist parties into 
the former RCP(B). Coleman to Secretary of State, 25 February 
1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/5911; Coleman to Secretary 
of State, 12 March 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/5960.
5 Baer, 181.
6 Coleman to Secretary of State, 15 May 1929, RG 59, 
861.00/54/6142.
7 J. Webb Benton to Secretary of State, 18 February 1929, 
RG 59, 861.00/38/2170.
8 GPU was the abbreviation for Gosudarstvennoye 
Politicheksoe Upravleniyer which translated to the State 
Political Administration Soviet Security Service. Paxton, 
157.
9 Coleman to Secretary of State, 28 May 1929, RG 59, 
861.00/56/6161.
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most of Bukharin's support from the AUCP(B),10 and in 
November, Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo. The Riga 
specialists reminded Washington that with Bukharin's expulsion 
from the Politburo, the last of Lenin's old Bolsheviks had 
been removed from power. Stalin now had complete control of 
the most powerful organ of the Soviet government.11
Loy M. Henderson, who was stationed at Riga, wrote that
by 1930, Stalin occupied:
a central position between, on the one hand, those 
elements of the party that were insisting that regardless 
of obstacles and possible dangers the party should press 
for the immediate realization of communist ideals in the 
Soviet Union and for quick social revolutions abroad under 
communist leadership, and, on the other hand, those 
elements that believed that the success of the party's 
world revolutionary program was so dependent on the 
development of a powerful and impregnable Soviet Union 
that the party in making basic policy decisions should be 
given primary consideration to the security and 
strengthening of the Soviet State.
As the Comintern mobilized to carry out Stalin's orders, 
the Soviet specialists reported that there was division within 
the ranks of the CPUSA. Many American communists were angered 
by the expulsion of Trotsky and Bukharin from the Politburo 
and AUCP(B). The Comintern leaders instructed the Americans
10 Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 February 1929, RG 59, 
861.00/5885; Coleman to Secretary of State, 6 April 1929, RG 
59, 861.00/6027.
11 Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 27 August 1929, RG 
84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6367; Coleman to Secretary of 
State, 20 November 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/88; 
Baer, 187; MacKenzie, 485; Lowenhardt, 25.
12 .As quoted in Baer, 187-88.
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to end their factionalism and carry out the instructions of 
the AUCP(B) and Stalin. In addition, the Comintern and 
Profintern leaders instructed the CPUSA to increase its 
membership by concentrating their recruiting efforts on new 
immigrants, unemployed workers and African-Americans.13 These 
groups were deeply affected by the Great Depression and by 
racism in the United States.14 To attract them, the Comintern 
ordered all cells of the CPUSA to be integrated. To enforce 
this rule, they ordered an African-American named Otto Hall 
to head the CPUSA cell in Norfolk, Virginia. Members who 
opposed the policy were expelled.15
The Soviet specialists reported that in November 1929 a 
group of American members of the Comintern and Profintern 
visited the Soviet Union. The Soviet press listed the names 
which were later sent to the DEEA with the report. These 
members of the CPUSA pledged that they would defend the Soviet 
Union, the homeland of socialism. If the United States were 
to wage war against the Soviet Union, they would start a civil 
war. They claimed that African-Americans were sympathetic to 
the Soviet Union and declared that American communists who 
supported Trotsky or Bukharin were to be expelled from the
13 Coleman to Secretary of State, 19 November 1929, RG 
84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6568.
14 Coleman to Secretary of State, 22 March 1929, RG 84, 
Russian Book 125, 800R/5994.
15 Coleman to Secretary of State, 19 August 1929, RG 84, 
Russian Book 125, 800R/6350.
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CPUSA.16
In 1929, neither the Russians nor the specialists 
expected the period of nonrecognition to end in the near 
future.17 Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, trade 
between the two nations was strong. However, the Amtorg 
Trading Cooperation founded in 1924 by the Soviet government 
to conduct trade with American business, reported that Soviet 
officials did not impress visiting American businessmen.18 
Amtorg officials wanted Soviet officials to be more open and 
courteous to American businessmen who visited the Soviet Union 
and allow them access to all industrial sites. Since the 
embryonic Soviet industries were dependent on the importation 
of machinery and tractors manufactured in the United States, 
the American businessmen had to be well treated. In addition, 
the Amtorg officials wanted Russians who worked there to study 
the American language and customs. The Riga specialists also 
noted that Amtorg was involved in propaganda activities; this 
in turn troubled Congressman Hamilton Fish. Fish had 
corresponded with Kelley throughout the 1920's concerning the
16 Coleman to Secretary of State, 22 March 1929, RG 84, 
Russian Book 125, 800R/5994; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
19 August 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6350; Coleman 
to Secretary of State, 19 November 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 
125, 800R/6568.
17 Coleman to Secretary of State, 31 December 1929, RG 
84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6674.
18 Robert F. Kelley, "Policy of the United States Towards 
Soviet Russia," 1929, in Kelley Papers; Bennett, 114-116.
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Soviet Union and the Comintern. In 1930 Fish requested that 
Kelley provide the reports from Riga concerning the Amtorg's 
subversive activities to his congressional committee. Fish 
used these reports to prove that Amtorg, like the Comintern 
and CPUSA was involved in propaganda activities in the United 
States.19
The Soviet government was also concerned with their image 
in the United States. In an attempt to improve their image, 
the government created Intourist to help foreign businessmen 
with transportation and hotel accommodations while in the 
Soviet Union as well as provide guides who spoke English.20 
Despite these services, American journalists reported problems 
within the Soviet Union. In their fact-gathering discussions 
with the Riga specialists, the journalists acknowledged that 
the Soviet's industrial capacity had made significant gains 
during the first five-year plan. However, the standard of 
living for the average Russian was poor. When the journalists 
printed their stories, the Soviet government accused them of 
being involved in a propaganda campaign to slander the Soviet
19 Coleman to Secretary of State, 29 February 1929, RG 
84, Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/5869; Coleman to Secretary of 
State, 5 June 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/6192; 
Robert F. Kelley to Congressman Hamilton Fish, 16 December 
1926, Box 2, Folder 4, in Kelley Papers; Kelley to Fish, 4 
June 1930, Box 3, Folder 5, in Kelley Papers.
20 Coleman to Secretary of State, 17 May 1929, RG 84 
Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/6150; Coleman to Secretary of
State, 27 May 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 122, 020-670R/6160.
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Union and AUCP(B) .21 They contended that the American 
journalists lied when they claimed that the Comintern and 
CPUSA were subversive organs of the Soviet Union and AUCP(B). 
The Soviets used the negative reports made by the American 
journalists to justify the propaganda efforts of the AUCP(B) 
and the Comintern.22
The Riga specialists recommended to the DEEA that 
although the Soviet government was angered by the American 
journalist reports, they would remain as a major trading 
partner with the United States. They also reported that the 
industrial strength of the Soviet Union would continue to 
improve. However, because their methods were based on 
socialist theories, the Soviet government would have 
difficulties meeting the goals of the five-year plan. The 
Soviet Union needed American machinery to achieve the goal of 
making the Soviet Union a self-sufficient socialist state. 
The Riga specialists recommended no change in the policy of
21 In an effort to further discredit the Soviet 
government, Kelley recommended that a prominent American 
communist Emma Goldman be allowed to return to the United 
States. Goldman had been deported in 1921 for communist 
agitation. However, after living in the Soviet Union she had 
become an opponent of the Soviet government which did not 
allow dissent. Kelley contended that she would be "an 
effective antidote to the propaganda with regard to the 
political and economic conditions in Soviet Russia," if she 
were allowed to return. Kelley to Secretary of State, 16 
November 1926, Box 3, Folder 5, in Kelley Papers; Filene, 147.
22 Coleman to Secretary of State, 7 January 1929, RG 84 
Russian Book 125, 800R/5815; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
31 December 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6674.
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nonrecognition and that the Soviet Union's dependence on 
American machinery be used as a leverage to force them to 
accept the United State's terms for recognition at some future 
date.23
From 1930 to 1931 the Riga specialists continued to 
report the ebb and flow of Stalin's dictatorship. They noted 
that the Soviet government's campaign to force the Russian 
peasants on the collective farms continued unabated. The 
Soviet government also initiated a plan to discredit claims 
by the United States that the Comintern was a subversive 
propaganda organ of the AUCP(B). The Riga specialists were 
especially disturbed by the terrorist tactics Stalin used to 
achieve his political and economic objectives in the Soviet 
Union. While Bukharin's communist followers willingly 
accepted their fates, the Russian peasants fought Stalin.24 
Coleman reported that in retaliation for the resistance,
25Stalm planned to annihilate the peasants. Based on
interviews with Russian peasants leaving the Soviet Union and
23 Coleman to Secretary of State, 19 April 1929, RG 84, 
Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/6354; Coleman to Secretary of 
State, 31 December 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6674; 
Baer, 187-89.
24 Coleman to Secretary of State, 26 February 1929, RG 
59, 86.5017/54/5923; Coleman to Secretary of State, 28 May 
1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6165; Coleman to Secretary 
of State, 8 January 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 144, 800R.
25 Coleman to Secretary of State, 3 January 1930, RG 84, 
Russian Book 144, 800R/6683; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
7 November 1930, RG 84; Russian Book 145, 800R/7340.
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Soviet press accounts, the Soviet specialists reported that 
the government confiscated all tractors and sent them to the 
collective farms. Peasants were forced to turn their crops 
over to the government at below-market value. Fearful of 
being classified as a kulak and being deported, peasants 
destroyed excess livestock and crops. This resulted in a 
shortage of grain and draft animals. In addition, the 
government was unable to transport crops to the cities. 
Ultimately food shortages occurred throughout the Soviet
Union.26
By the end of 1931, the specialists now joined by the 
first graduates of Kelley's specialist program, George F. 
Kennan and William M. Gwynn, reported that Stalin's five-year 
plan would not meet the industrial and agricultural goals set 
in 1928.27 Russian peasants who moved to the factories were 
not properly trained to run and maintain the machinery.
Coleman to Secretary of State, 14 May 1929, Russian 
Book 130, RG 84, 800R/6141; Coleman to Secretary of State, 7 
June 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6196; Coleman to
Secretary of States, 3 January 193 0, RG 84, Russian Book 144, 
800R/6683; Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 4 February 1930, 
RG 84, Russian Book 149, 861R/Telegram 5; Sussdorff to 
Secretary of State, 14 March 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 149, 
861R/6848; Coleman to Secretary of State, 21 July 30; RG 84, 
Russian Book 149, 861.31R/Telegram 34; Coleman to Secretary 
of State, 7 November 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 145, 800R/7340; 
Lelchuk, 164-73.
27 "The American Foreign Service Journal," February 1933: 
61, in Kelley Papers; Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950. 33-34;
Coleman to Secretary of State, 8 January 1930, RG 84, Russian 
Book 144, 800R; Coleman to Secretary of State, 24 January 
1931, RG 84 Russian Book 167, 800R/7448.
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Foreign technicians were needed to maintain Soviet factories 
but they were disliked and distrusted by both Russian 
communists and peasants. Inflation was rampant in the Soviet 
Union and food shortages abounded. By April 1931, the
specialists reported that Stalin was forced to institute a 
policy called the "Mini-NEP" in certain areas of the Soviet 
Union. This policy allowed peasants to be given small plots 
of land controlled by the state where they could grow and sell 
food at market prices. Coleman wrote that these events were 
warnings to Stalin and the AUCP(B) that planned economies did 
not work.28
In addition to the problems in the Soviet Union, Stalin 
faced resistance within the CPUSA to his programs. In March 
1930, the Riga specialists reported that Stalin became
directly involved in the operations of the CPUSA. Many 
American communists refused to obey Stalin and the AUCP(B). 
Despite the recommendations made by the leaders of the 
Comintern and Profintern in 1929, membership in their 
American counterparts remained low. Some American communists 
argued that since the economic and political history of the 
United States was unique, socialism in the United States would 
evolve differently from the Soviet Union. Finally economic 
and political reforms made by the United States government
28 Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 January 1930, RG 84,
Russian Book 149, 815.R/6690; Coleman to Secretary of State,
RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7609.
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further delayed the evolution of the United States towards 
socialism.29
Stalin rebuked those who disagreed with his policies. 
He asserted that capitalism was the same regardless of the 
country, and that the United States would only become a 
capitalist state if the CPUSA remained faithful to the 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine as he defined it. He further 
contended that factionalism within the CPUSA had to end and 
that there would be no compromise with those who followed 
Trotsky and Bukharin. Stalin predicted that the United States 
was on the verge of war with its great imperialist rival, 
Great Britain, and that when the war began, the CPUSA must be 
ready to lead the bolshevik revolution in the United States.30
In November 1930, the specialists reported Stalin's 
goals for the Comintern and its subordinate groups. The 
communist parties of the Comintern and Prof intern accepted the 
policy of building socialism in the Soviet Union as a 
priority. Stalin informed the communists that in an attempt 
to end the Great Depression, the capitalist nations would go 
to war with each other, and the Soviet Union in order to 
pursue new markets and raw materials. When this occurred, 
members of the Comintern were to mobilize the masses to
O Q Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 14 March 1930, RG 84, 
Russian Book 147, 800R/6849; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
19 June 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 144, 800R/7054.
30 Ibid.
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protest, strike and, if necessary, create a civil war against 
the capitalist governments in order to protect the Soviet 
Union. The Great Depression was the precursor to the world 
proletarian revolution.31
Riga also noted that the Profintern was very active in 
the United States and its colony, the Philippines, in 1930- 
31. In the United States the Prof intern worked with the 
Comintern to attract African-Americans and Filipinos to their 
organizations. In their efforts to recruit African-Americans, 
American communists asserted that in a socialist nation racial 
segregation did not exist. The racially motivated trial of 
the Scottsboro boys was used by the American communists to 
prove their claim and recruit new members. Propaganda 
material which specifically targeted African-Americans was 
printed by both organizations overseas and smuggled into the 
United States.32
The Comintern and Profintern supported the formation of 
the Philippine Communist Party (PCP) in 1930. A series of 
small insurrections initiated by the PCP against the United
31 Coleman to Secretary of State, 7 November 1930, RG 84, 
Russian Book 145, 800R/7340; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
5 February 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7423.
32 John E. Kehl (Consul General, Hamburg) to Coleman, 17 
April 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 166, 800R/7630; Felix Cole to 
Secretary of State, 5 June 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 
800R/7773; Coleman to Secretary of State, 26 June 1931, RG 84, 
Russian Book 163, 800R/7823; David MacGowan to Secretary of 
State, 3 July 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7837; Cole 
to Secretary of State, 28 July 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 
800R/7904.
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States were organized but were quickly extinguished by the 
colonial government. The Riga specialists noted the 
communists in the Philippines took advantage of the fact that 
most of the land in the archipelago was owned by a few 
influential families who ruled the islands with the support 
of the Americans. The PCP informed the Filipinos that the 
United States was considering granting them independence only 
because American sugar beet and cotton oil manufacturers 
wanted to end the importation of competitive and less 
expensive sugar and coconut oil from the Philippines. Because 
the archipelago was a territory of the United States, there 
were no duties on Philippine imports.33
The communists played on the racial fears of the African- 
Americans in the United States by claiming that Filipinos were 
brought to the United States because they were cheap labor and 
would replace them in the factories. By contrast Filipinos 
were told that once the colony was granted independence, they 
would be allowed in the United States.34 Unfortunately, many 
of the charges made by the communists concerning racial
33 Coleman to Secretary of State, 31 May 1931, RG 84, 
Russian Book 165, 800R/7733; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
6 June 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 165, 800R/7824.
34 Cole to Secretary of State, 5 June 1931, RG 84, 
Russian Book 163, 800R/7773; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
6 June 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 165, 800R/7824; Coleman to 
Secretary of State, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7823; 
MacGowan to Secretary of State, 3 July 1931, RG 84, Russian 
Book 163, 800R/7837; Cole to Secretary of State, 28 July 1931, 
RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7904.
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prejudice against the African-Americans and Filipinos in the 
early 1930's were true.
Beginning in 1930, Congress became concerned about the 
activities of the Comintern, Profintern and their subordinate 
organizations. They authorized Congressman Hamilton Fish to 
investigate Amtorg and the activities of all Comintern 
organizations in the United States. The committee was to 
determine if these organizations advocated "the overthrow by 
violence the Government of the United States, or attempt to 
undermine our republican form of government by inciting riots, 
sabotage, and revolutionary disorders."35 Fish reguested that 
Kelley provide the committee with the Riga reports for use as 
evidence. Kelley sent the reports requested to the 
committee.36 In the end the committee, armed with the reports, 
concluded that Amtorg, the Comintern and the CPUSA were 
subversive propaganda organs of the United States government. 
However, they did not restrict their activities.37
The Soviet Union reacted angrily to the actions of the 
Fish Committee. They insisted that the committee should 
investigate the racial violence against the African-Americans
35 House Resolution 180, 5 March 1930, Box 3, Folder 5, 
in Kelley Papers; Filene, 229-34.
36 Kelley to Undersecretary of State Cotton, 4 June 1930, 
Box 3, Folder 4, in Kelley Papers; Robert F. Kelley, 
"Communist Activities in the United States," Box 3, Folder 4, 
in Kelley Papers.
37 Kelley to Undersecretary of State Cotton, 4 June 1930, 
Box 3, Folder 5, in Kelley Papers.
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and the cruel imperialist policies of the United States in the 
Philippines and Latin America. The Riga reports indicated 
that the Soviet government reacted in this manner because the 
Congress was considering restricting Soviet imports to the 
United States based on the findings of the Fish Committee. 
Congress accused the Soviet Union of exporting goods to the 
United States that were made by slave or forced labor. The 
Soviet government asserted that forced labor was only used to 
build roads and canals. On the other hand, the Soviet 
government accused the United States of considering joining 
an economic blockade with other capitalist nations against the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet government warned the United States 
to carefully consider its course of action. They reminded the 
United States that trade without recognition was good between 
the two nations. However, if the United States persisted in 
its political attacks, the Soviet government would not allow 
American exports into the Soviet Union. They asserted that 
the United States needed trade with the Soviet Union, however
• • • • 38the Soviet Union did not need trade with the United States.
Coleman on his own initiative responded to the Soviet 
accusations in two reports to the State Department. He wrote 
that under international law the Soviet Union was responsible
38 Coleman to Secretary of State, 24 January 1931, RG 84, 
Russian Book 167, 800R/7448; Coleman to Secretary of State, 
12 February 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7496; Coleman 
to Secretary of State, 29 April 1931, Russian Book 163, 
800R/7741.
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for the actions of the Comintern and its subservient organs. 
Most of the leaders of the Comintern were members of the 
Soviet government and the AUCP(B); thus the Comintern and its 
subsidiary organs were organs of the Soviet government. He 
maintained further that the Soviet government controlled the 
means of production in the Soviet Union. Many of the peasants 
and workers were coerced into accepting the jobs assigned to 
them by the Soviet government. He asserted that their 
inability to chose their jobs was compulsory labor and 
violated United States trade laws.39
In 1932, Wilbur Carr, head of the DFSA, sent Robert F.
Skinner to replace Coleman in Riga. Carr made this move as
part of his continuing struggle within the State Department 
to end the policy of allowing FSOs to specialize in the 
affairs of one country. Skinner was a generalist who shared 
Carr's belief that FSOs should not specialize in one country 
or region. Furthermore, Skinner did not believe in the policy 
of nonrecognition. During his first year, he tried to impose 
his views on the mission. Instead of writing lengthy reports, 
Skinner wanted the Soviet experts to submit brief abstracts 
to the State Department. The Riga staff and his superiors at 
the DEEA resisted his efforts to change established methods
39 Secretary of State to American Legation (Riga), 29
January 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 149, 850.4R; Coleman to
Secretary of State, 14 July 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 144, 
800R/7101; Coleman to Secretary of State, 24 January 1931, RG 
84, Russian Book 167, 800R/7448.
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and after one year of resistance, he complied with the will 
of his superiors and became a reluctant supporter of the 
policy of ncnrecognition.40 Fortunately for Skinner that 
policy would soon change.
The year 1932 was significant because it was 
presidential election year in the United States. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was the Democratic Party's candidate for President. 
He was known as a liberal and many of his followers favored 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In 
anticipation of Roosevelt's election Russian specialists at 
Riga and the DEEA made preparations to conduct negotiations 
which would lead to diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union.41 At Skinner's request seven specialists, Felix Cole, 
Clarence B. Hewes, W. J. Gallman, William M. Gwynn, Landreth 
M. Harrison, George F. Kennan and John A. Lehrs, compiled a 
report entitled "Reflections on Russia." Skinner was so 
impressed with their response that he submitted their paper 
enclosures with his report.42
Skinner determined that the specialists felt no hostility 
towards the Russians, however they were hostile to the 
communist ideology of the AUCP(B). The seven men reached 
similar conclusions concerning the Soviet Union. First,
40 Propas, "The State Department," 144-49.
41 Baer, 216-17; Propas, "The State Department," 163-64.
42 Robert F. Skinner to Secretary of State, 24 March 
1932, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 801R/193.
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political change in the Soviet Union would be revolutionary 
and not evolutionary. Second, the Soviet Union only wanted 
formal relations with the United States in order to receive 
economic loans or credits from American banks. The Soviet 
Union may be persuaded to pay its past debts if it were 
politically and economically advantageous to do so. Third, 
the Soviet government would reduce its involvement with the 
Comintern only if it were politically expedient. Fourth, when 
the United States initiated negotiations for recognition, it 
should be guided by principle and not political expediency. 
Finally, recognition would benefit the Soviet Union more than 
the United States. Even without recognition the Soviet Union 
was a major importer of American products. Again they 
reiterated the fact that the Soviet Union needed American 
machinery to reach the goals of the second five-year plan.43
The specialists believed that if the United States 
recognized the Soviet Union the following could be expected: 
First, the Soviet Union would repudiate any agreements 
concerning the Comintern if it were in its interest to do so. 
Second, once the United States granted the Soviet Union "de 
facto" recognition, the Soviet government would expect to be 
given most favored nation treaty status. Finally, the Soviet 
government would expect the United States to force American 
bankers to give the Soviet Union favorable credits and loans
43 Ibid.
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without preconditions. The Riga specialists based this 
assessment on a thorough study of all treaties and agreements 
signed by the Soviet Union with other nations.44
In his report, Skinner warned the State Department to
approach the issue of recognition with caution. The Soviet
Union had never fulfilled any treaty in which they agreed to
pay previous debts nor had they desisted in their support of
the Comintern. Skinner advised:
All in all, it appears to be necessary that we continue 
our attitude of watchful waiting, hoping that the Soviet 
government will mend its way, always disposed, ourselves, 
to be bear in mind our long-standing friendship with the 
Russian people and to enter relations with their 
government on the same terms which have guided our 
relations with other governments born out of revolutionary 
conditions.45
However, there were other issues to consider. In 1931 
Japan seized Manchuria. Japanese aggression in China worried 
both the Soviet Union and the United States. The specialists 
reported that the Soviet Union was prepared to establish 
diplomatic relations with the United States in order to deter 
further Japanese aggression in China. The Red Army was not 
strong enough to fight Japan and the Soviet Union needed the 
help of the United States to stop Japanese aggression. The 
Soviet government believed that the visit of Army chief of 
staff, General Douglas MacArthur, to Poland in the fall of 
1932 was a precursor to Soviet-American negotiations. They
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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believed that MacArthur was in Poland to ascertain the 
strength of the Red Army and to warn the Polish government not 
to attack the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Japan.46
In November 1932, Roosevelt was elected President. After 
the election, the Riga specialists again thoroughly studied 
the various trade agreements and treaties between the Soviet 
Union and other nations in anticipation of a change in United 
States policy. In April 1933, Skinner and Kennan reported the 
results of their research to the State Department. Kennan 
advised that all treaties with the Soviets should be specific 
written agreements. American diplomats were warned that they 
would be dealing with a government based on communist 
ideology. The Soviet government controlled all political and 
economic activities in the Soviet Union; therefore special 
clauses would have to be written into the treaty which would 
protect the civil liberties of American citizens. In 
addition, the United States would have to establish strict 
economic and trade guidelines to protect the interests of 
American businessmen from the Soviet government's "foreign
46 Skinner to Secretary of State, 24 February 1932, RG 
84, Russian Book 200, 030R-800R/87; William N. Castle
(Division of Western European Affairs) to Skinner, 17 December 
1933, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 801-R/143; Skinner to Secretary 
of State, 20 December 1932, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 801- 
R/1002; Skinner to Secretary of State, 23 March 1932, RG 84, 
Russian Book 224, 820R/1232.
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trade monopoly."47 Skinner followed Kennan's report with a 
draft of a proposed commercial treaty based on the 
recommendations found in Kennan's report. Both men believed 
that it was important that the agreements contain specific 
language which restricted interference by both nations in 
internal political affairs.48
In June 1933, the DEEA informed the specialists that in 
order to establish diplomatic relations, the Soviet Union 
would have to negotiate and pay some of the previous debts. 
According to the DEEA, the Soviet Union owed the United States 
$2,614,025.70 from the Tsar's government and $327,583,071.37 
from the Provisional government. When Great Britain and 
France established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, 
they negotiated a settlement to pay the debts owed to both 
nations. After eleven years, no payments had been made. 
However, the division believed that Stalin would be willing 
to pay the Provisional government's debt in the form of an 
interest payment on the loan, and only place a counter-claim 
against the Tsarist government debts. The DEEA further 
recommended that private debts be arbitrated at the
47 George F. Kennan, "Notes on Russian Commercial Treaty 
Procedures,11 with cover letter, Skinner to Secretary of State, 
5 April 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 233, 631R/1270.
48 Robert F. Skinner to Secretary of State, 20 April 
1933, RG-84, Russian Book 215, 631R-US/1299.
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international court at the Hague.49
The Riga specialists believed that the United States 
would be able to bargain from a position of strength when 
negotiations were initiated with the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union needed American equipment in order to meet the goals of 
the second five-year plan. On the other hand, the economy of 
the United States did not depend on exports to the Soviet 
Union to sustain it. This would not allow the Soviet 
government to hold an agreement hostage to a threatened trade 
embargo. Finally, the specialists recommended that American 
businessmen not base their trade requirements on the Soviet 
Union's economic figures because they were manipulated to 
obtain bargains from the western market. In order to provide 
American businessmen with accurate figures, a special economic 
foundation should be established which would focus on the 
Soviet economy and make recommendations based on economic data 
obtained from neutral sources. The foundation would be funded 
by both the public and private sectors.50 The specialists and 
Stalin were clearly in disagreement as to who needed 
diplomatic relations more, the Soviet Union or the United 
States.
While the Soviet government may have been prepared to
49 Division of Eastern European Affairs to American 
Legation (Riga), 19 June 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 224, 851R.
50 Cole to Secretary of State, 24 August 1933, RG 84, 
Russian Book 215, 631.R-US/1540; Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 
50-51.
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make concessions to the United States in order to establish 
diplomatic relations, it made no concessions to the Russian 
people. The Riga specialists cited Soviet press accounts 
which reported the closing and conversion of churches, 
synagogues and mosques into factories, grain silos and 
offices. Only women in Russia attended religious services, 
the men stayed away in fear of being persecuted by the 
government. This was purportedly done at the request of the 
Soviet workers.51 Russians who married American workers in 
the Soviet Union were terrorized by the secret police, the 
NKVD. Russians fleeing the Soviet Union reported that the 
people were tired of the demands placed on them to meet the 
goals of the second five-year plan and that there were 
shortages of food and consumer goods. Stalin diverted scarce 
industrial resources to build up the Soviet armed forces 
instead of manufacturing consumer products. Russian peasants 
were still being terrorized and coerced by the Soviet 
government to move on to the collective farms and the Soviet 
government continued subversive propaganda activities under 
the auspices of the Comintern against the United States.52
51 Cole to Secretary of State, 8 January 1932, RG 84, 
Russian Book 195, 840.4R-850.32R/8368; Cole to Secretary of 
State, 7 September 1932, RG 84, Russian Book 195, 840.4R- 
850.32R/8368; Cole to Secretary of State, 9 December 1933, RG 
84, Russian Book 215; 800R/1752.
52 A. E. Carleton to Secretary of State, 30 December 
1932, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 800R/51; Edward S. Crocker to 
Secretary of State, 1 March 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 224, 
804.4R/703; Skinner to Secretary of State, 21 April 1933, RG
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Nevertheless, in October 1933, Roosevelt, after 
determining that Congress and the American people supported 
the issue, decided that it was time to recognize the Soviet 
government. The President was under pressure from American 
business to establish relations with the Soviet Union. This 
would enable the United States to increase its exports, thus 
creating more jobs during the depression. Roosevelt was also 
very concerned about Japanese aggression. He realized that 
the American people would not support unilateral action to 
curb Japanese aggression in Asia. However, if the United 
States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,
Japan might be intimidated into ending its expansionist policy
■, • 53in Asia.
From this point on, Roosevelt assumed responsibility for 
Soviet-American relations until he died in 1945. Like Woodrow 
Wilson, Roosevelt delegated the task of approaching the Soviet 
government with the issue of recognition to special envoys. 
The envoys were two of his two closest associates, Henry 
Morgenthau and William C. Bullitt. The president believed 
that the FSOs of the State Department would be hesitant in 
supporting his policy. Bullitt, however, turned to Kelley and 
the DEEA staff to provide him with materials necessary to
84, Russian Book 233, 800R/1301; Cole to Secretary of State, 
9 December 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 215, 800R/1752.
53 Baer, 236-37; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
American Foreign Policy. 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 79-80.
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negotiate the treaty with the Soviets. He also chose Kelley, 
with Roosevelt's approval, as a member of the negotiating 
team.54
The Soviet government accepted Roosevelt's invitation to 
begin negotiations. Maxim Litvinov, one of the more 
experienced diplomats in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, 
was sent by Stalin to negotiate on behalf of the Soviet Union. 
The president's advisors and the DEEA established the 
conditions for recognition which would serve as the basis for 
negotiations. On the issue of debt payments, the United 
States would focus on repayment of the loans made to the 
Kerensky government and would make a provision acknowledging 
repayment for private property seized by the Soviet government 
which was owned by Americans. The Soviet Union and the 
Comintern would be prohibited from sending communist 
propaganda into the United States and American citizens would 
be allowed to practice their religion. Roosevelt added the 
conditions regarding religious freedom in order to gain the 
support of American religious groups who were opposed to 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.55 Furthermore, 
American nationals residing in the Soviet Union who were 
arrested would have quick access to United States diplomats 
or consular officers and would be entitled to a public and
Baer, 236-37; Dallek 79-80; Propas, "The State 
Department," 163-67.
55 Baer, 238-43; Dallek, 79.
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just trial and would be adequately protected from ambiguous 
charges such as "economic espionage."56 Litvinov arrived in 
Washington on 8 November 1933. Negotiations were difficult. 
He refused to sign any agreement concerning the payment of 
debts, nor would he acknowledge that the Comintern was a 
subversive organ of the Soviet Union. He was angered with the 
documentation presented by Bullitt and Kelley which supported 
the position of the United States. According to Kennan, 
Litvinov knew that the Russian section of the Riga mission 
provided the documentation. He informed Kelley that the 
DEEA's records were superior to the Soviet government's own 
records. By 10 November, negotiations had reached an 
impasse.57
The impasse was broken when Roosevelt decided to meet 
with Litvinov. By 15 November they reached a gentleman's 
agreement concerning the establishment of diplomatic 
recognition. Litvinov agreed that the Soviet Union would not 
interfere in the internal affairs of the United States. To 
the disappointment of Kelley and the specialists, the 
Comintern was not mentioned by name; they believed this would 
allow the Soviet government to continue to deny it had any 
control over the activities of the Comintern. The issue of 
debt payments was to be negotiated after normal diplomatic
56 Baer, 237, 242.
57 Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 47-48, 83-84; Baer, 244- 
45; Dallek, 79-80.
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relations between the two nations had been established. 
American citizens in the Soviet Union were granted the right 
to practice their religion, and the American consul was to be 
immediately contacted when an American citizen was arrested. 
On 16 November 1933, Roosevelt announced that the United 
States had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union.58
For thirteen years, the Riga specialists observed the 
Soviet Union. They collected the evidence that was used by 
Bullitt and Kelley to effectively argue the position of the 
United States during the negotiations to establish diplomatic 
relations. They advised the government that in order to make 
the Soviet Union acknowledge its international obligations, 
agreements must be in writing and contain specific language. 
They also warned the government that the negotiations should 
not be based on political expediency. Unfortunately for the 
Riga specialists the world situation forced the United States 
to reconsider the policy of nonrecognition with the Soviet 
Union. Roosevelt believed that aggressive nations like Japan, 
Italy and later Germany were greater threats to the United 
States than the Soviet Union and the Comintern. In addition, 
the president may have decided it was safe to recognize the 
Soviet Union based on the fact that even in the midst of a
58 U.S. Department of State, Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations With The Union Soviet Socialist Republics 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1933), 5-13; Baer, 245-55; Dallek,
79-81.
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deep depression Americans overwhelmingly rejected the 
political and economic agenda of the CPUSA in national 
elections. Soviet-American relations entered a new phase with 
Roosevelt's election to the presidency.
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CONCLUSION
The reforms initiated by Robert Lansing between 1918 and 
1920 served many purposes. First, the reforms allowed for the 
selection of foreign service officers based on capability and 
not political patronage. Second, Lansing set the standard for 
FSOs to be professionals dedicated to the art of diplomacy. 
Third, he established the practice whereby FSOs kept the 
president and secretary of state informed about the political 
and economic conditions in the country where they were 
stationed. Finally, Lansing hoped to end the use of special 
envoys by the president. Special envoys created confusion 
both at home and abroad as to who represented the policies of 
the United States: the special envoys or the FSOs. The use 
of special envoys could be ended only if the president had 
trust and confidence in the abilities of his diplomats.
The Soviet specialists were the type of FSOs Lansing 
believed should serve the State Department. Due in large part 
to the reforms he initiated, they were selected because of 
their capability; not political patronage. They were 
dedicated to their profession and kept the United States 
government well informed concerning the political activities 
of the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The professional
96
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reputation of the specialists was excellent and they used 
their expertise to serve five presidents between 1919 and 
1933.
As this thesis has shown, the specialists' memoirs and 
the reports they wrote in Riga demonstrated their hostility 
to the communist ideology of the Soviet Union. Yet their task 
was in essence a negative one; they were to use their 
expertise to support nonrecognition. The specialists were 
prepared to be flexible and to negotiate with the Soviet Union 
on the issue of debt, payments. However, they believed their 
reports proved that the Comintern and its American subsidiary 
organization, the CPUSA were organs of the Soviet government. 
Such activities, which the specialists saw as direct 
interference in the internal affairs of the United States, 
could not be so easily compromised. Until the Soviet Union 
acknowledged and then renounced the activities of the 
Comintern and the CPUSA, the specialists believed it was in 
the best interest of the United States to continue the policy 
of nonrecognition.
Historians must be careful to evaluate the Riga reports 
in the context of the times in which they were written. 
Between 1919 and 1933, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were not two super powers leading two hostile blocks of 
nations. During that period, the two nations were part of a 
group of great powers that included Great Britain, France, 
Italy, Germany, Japan and China. Both nations were not part
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of any alliances. Therefore the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was bilateral. It was 
based on this relationship that the Riga specialists wrote 
their reports and came to their conclusions concerning the 
Soviet Union.
Due to the clear direction and high standards established 
by Kelley, the Riga specialists were able to evolve as 
Russian/Soviet scholars as well as FSOs. The evidence used 
by the Riga specialists was the best available under the 
conditions in which they operated. The specialists based 
their conclusions on empirical evidence. Information received 
from interviews was tested against other interviews and Soviet 
publications for validity. Since all publications in the 
Soviet Union were controlled by the government, all 
pronouncements found were considered Soviet policy. This was 
especially true after Stalin assumed full control of the 
country and the party. When the archives of the Soviet 
government in Russia are opened to the public, historians will 
be able to more accurately evaluate the validity of the 
methods used by the specialists to study the Soviet Union and 
defend the policy of nonrecognition.
If the specialists had a fault it was that they were too 
focused, as their critics claimed, on the relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the United States.1 The specialists at
1 Yergin, 8-14; Propas, "The State Department," 167-73, 
229-31.
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Riga and in the DEEA did not attempt to analyze how the lack 
of diplomatic relations with the Soviet effected United States 
foreign policy as a whole. Roosevelt believed that they did 
not understand his foreign policy concerns and objectives. 
As a result, Roosevelt, like Wilson, returned to the use of 
special envoys to implement his foreign policy initiatives in 
1933. Yet one of those envoys, William C. Bullitt, still 
turned to the Riga specialists for advice. The counsel they 
gave was still accurate; it simply did not reflect the 
political and international considerations which motivated 
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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